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INTRODUCTION: PERSONAL INFORMATION AND PRIVACY

This Article explores the privacy concerns that arise when nonprofit
fundraisers trade, sell, rent or otherwise exploit personal information about
charitable donors that they obtain in the course of obtaining donations. Drawing
from the experience of consumers in the sales context, t it considers whether
donors who make gifts should be equated with consumers who make purchases,
and therefore should fall within the reach of traditional and statutory consumer
privacy protections. Part I briefly explores the jurisprudence of privacy and
developing concern about the divulgence of personal information by private
corporations, including nonprofit corporations. Part II addresses the
contemporary market for personal information. The practice of compiling,
selling, and renting charitable donor lists is addressed specifically. Part III
considers consumer concerns, economic benefits, as well as the commercial
interest in this trade. Part IV addresses the theoretical and case law bases for
comparing donors to consumers.
Part V discusses government responses to the problems associated with this
trade, including key consumer protection statutes and their shortcomings. Part
VI describes the administrative avenues of redress that might be open to
charitable donors, but are not. This Part demonstrates how, with respect to the
sale of charitable donor lists, there is little if anything the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) or state attorneys general are doing at present to protect
donor privacy. Additionally, this Part explains problems consumers and donors
have faced in the judicial arena, particularly in light of the recent New York
Appellate Division decision, Smith v. Chase ManhattanBank.2
The Authors conclude that at least in the context of informational privacy,
the interests of donors essentially mirror those of consumers. Consumers and
donors alike have a strong interest in maintaining the privacy of their personal
information. Any distinction based on the difference between a gift and a sale

fails to take into account the purpose of all privacy laws, namely, to control the
dissemination of personal information without the consent of the persons about
See infra notes 92-119 and accompanying text.
2 741 N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
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whom the information is collected, or, as Justice Brandeis insisted more than a
century ago, the assurance of the right to be let alone. 3 Moreover, considering
important public policy objectives, which include the encouragement of
donations and of gratuitous undertakings, as well as maintaining public trust in
nonprofit organizations, this Article argues that protecting the private
information of donors should be treated as tantamount to protecting the
personal information of consumers.
Having presented the case for protecting the privacy rights of donors, and
having explained the failure to do so until the present time, the Authors suggest
three ways to proceed. This Article makes the case for the extension to donors
of federal opt-out protections similar to those currently available in some
commercial contexts. It proposes limitations on the collection and use of
personal data about donors by nonprofit organizations, including a "do not
share" registry; and it suggests a federal statutory right of action that would
give individual donors a right of action against organizations, which, against
the will of donors, share personal information.
A.

The JurisprudenceofPrivacy

As a law student and later as a Justice on the Supreme Court, Louis
Brandeis championed a broad constitutional and common law right to privacy.
The formulation he used in his pioneering 1890 article, The Right to Privacy,4
embraced different personal concerns, such as a claim for common law
protection of privacy based on tort theories and contract theories, including
breach of confidence5 actions to protect what today is referred to as personal
information privacy or consumer privacy. Although Brandeis did not receive
3 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis,

The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv.
(1890). The article was written, as the famous story goes, in response to officious 193
news
coverage of Brandeis daughter's wedding. The Authors claimed that the right of
privacy with
respect to ordinary behavior in everyday life existed independently of the form
in which
publication of such behavior took place. They provided this example:
A man writes a dozen letters to different people. No person would be permitted
to publish a
list of the letters written ....The copyright of a series of paintings or etchings
would prevent
a reproduction of the paintings as pictures; but it would not prevent a publication
of a list or
even a description of them. Yet in the famous case of Prince Albert v. Strange,
the court held
that the common-law rule prohibited not merely the reproduction of the etchings
which the
plaintiff and Queen Victoria had made for their own pleasure, but also the "publishing
...a
description of them, whether more or less limited or summary, whether in
the form of a
catalogue or otherwise.'"

Id. at 201-02.
4See id.
' "[fln some instances where protection has been afforded against wrongful publication,
the
jurisdiction has been asserted, not on the ground of property ...but upon the
ground of an
alleged breach of an implied contract or of a trust or confidence." Id.
at 207 (citing
Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 L.J. Ch. 209 (1825) where the court granted an injunction
against
publication of a surgeon's lectures on the ground of breach of confidence and
trust). For a
discussion on the privacy torts, see generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652

(1977).
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immediate support for his views on this subject, the High Court over the next
half-century endorsed many of them. In 1928 he enshrined his law review
argument in a Supreme Court dissent. "The right to be let alone [is] the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by a [free people]," he
6
wrote.
By 1951, the Court had moved considerably toward the Brandeis position.
Notwithstanding important First Amendment concerns, Justice Reed, in Breard
v. Alexandria, presented the view that
[t]here is... unanimity that opportunists, for private gain, cannot be permitted
to arm themselves with an acceptable principle, such as . . a privilege to
engage in interstate commerce, or a free press, and proceed to use it as an iron
standard to 7smooth their path by crushing the living rights of others to privacy
and repose.
Later, in Katz v. United States, 8 Griswold v. Connecticut,9 and other cases, the
Court legitimized the existence of an individual's right to a "reasonable

expectation" of privacy in contexts other than those of the consumer
marketplace.10 A privacy right has been invoked in the Court's protection of
6

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

7 341 U.S. 622, 625-26 (1951) (upholding a local prohibition on door-to-door sales
solicitations).
8 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (legitimizing the term "privacy" and holding that citizens have rights
to their "reasonable" and/or "legitimate" expectations of privacy in the Fourth Amendment
search and seizure context).
9 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that there is a fundamental right to privacy that prohibits laws
criminalizing birth control and further construing the privacy right as one that implicitly
exists in the "penumbra of the Bill of Rights").
10The reasonable expectation of privacy paradigm has been discussed in many different
contexts. See, e.g., Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Databases, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 393, 394
(2002) (stating that the reasonable expectation of privacy framework has been applied to
protect only information that expresses identity and not personal information per se); Orin S.
Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a "Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy?," 33 CONN. L. REV. 503 (2001) (arguing that government
encryption without a search warrant cannot violate the Fourth Amendment); Patricia Mell,
Big Brother at the Door: Balancing National Security With Privacy Under the USA
PATRIOTAct, 80 DENy. U. L. REV. 375 (2002) (discussing the right to privacy as it relates
to issues of national security); Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy,
Property, and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647 (1991) (discussing privacy in
the context of tort actions); Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy and the Human Body, 80 B.U.
L. REV. 359 (2000) (exploring the application of the constitutional right to privacy to the
human body); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy andAutonomy in FourthAmendment Cases: An EmpiricalLook at "Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DuKE L.J. 727 (1993) (providing social science
data to suggest that expectations of privacy and autonomy reflect realistic societal attitudes);
Daniel J. Solove, Remedying Privacy Wrongs-New Models: Identity Theft, Privacy, and the
Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227 (2003) (arguing that the problems
associated with the expectation of privacy and identify theft have not been adequately
conceptualized, thereby leading to misdirected enforcement efforts); Scott E. Sundby,
Everyman's Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and
Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (1994). Several scholars contend that the Supreme
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interests in areas including bodily privacy,11 informational privacy,' 2
membership in political groups, 13 privacy in physical places, 14 and decisional
privacy. 15

The Rehnquist Court in recent years has been more protective of
commercial speech rights than previous courts, and it has been none too
zealous about the protection of privacy in several fields of law. 16 Nonetheless,
Court's emphasis on a reasonable expectation of privacy is flawed. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin,
The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL
L. REV. 1258, 1328-30 (1990); Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model
for FourthAmendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583 (1989).
"See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the fundamental right to privacy
implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment invalidates blanket prohibitions on abortion).
12See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (upholding the privacy of personally
identifiable driver information and the federal Drivers Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2721 (2000); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (asserting a Fourteenth Amendment
privacy interest requiring confidentiality to protect prescription drug use information
collected by states).
13See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (recognizing the right to privacy in the
context of personal use of pornography in one's own home); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958) (upholding a privacy interest in membership lists relating to the right of
organization members to pursue their interests privately).
14See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (upholding the privacy of government
employee's office, desk, and files); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980)
(finding arrest warrant mandatory for home arrests because of a heightened privacy
expectation); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958) (upholding privacy rights in one's
home). But cf Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (holding that flying over one's
backyard is not protected by the Fourth Amendment); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,
40-41 (1988) (holding that rummaging through one's garbage is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (same); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1970) (holding that motor vehicles have a reduced expectation
of privacy). For an interesting discussion on employee privacy in the workplace, see Alan F.
Westin, Privacy in the Workplace: How Well Does American Law Reflect American
Values?, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 271 (1996).
15See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (recognizing decisional privacy interests
in familial contexts-child rearing, marriage and procreation); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967) (recognizing privacy and equality interests in interracial marriages); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)
(holding that family relationships are within the realm of privacy that the state cannot
regulate); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that the power to
sterilize is a violation of a person's ability to procreate, which is a fundamental liberty);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the right to teach children
different languages is a protected right under the Fourteenth Amendment). But cf
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (declining to recognize a right to physician
assisted suicide that would invalidate state laws criminalizing that activity); Cruzan v.
Missouri Dept. of Pub. Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding the states may require families
to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a patient is in a hopeless persistent
vegetative state prior to terminating life support).
16"In this cluster of 'privacy related' cases, the [Rehnquist] Court has described the specific
right in question in liberty terms rather than in privacy terms. Under the Rehnquist Court,
privacy nomenclature rarely occurs, and individual rights are treated directly as part of the
liberty that is protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments." G. Sidney Buchanan. .4 Very Rational Court, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1509, 1571-
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the Court has upheld the validity of several consumer privacy statutes designed
to limit marketing practices and collection tactics used by commercial
enterprises-statutes that have limited the right of commercial parties to gather
and share information about individuals and that have been passed by state and
federal legislatures.' 7 The enactment and judicial defense of privacy provisions
contained in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act, the Telemarketing Privacy Act, the Bank Privacy Act, and the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, and also the expansion of
common law tort remedies in the area of unwanted publicity and privacy,
manifest unusually assertive legislative and judicial action on behalf of civil
liberty-especially unusual given recent trends, post-September 11, to sanction
invasions of privacy by government in the interest of security.'s
Appreciation for the strength of the consumer right to privacy in the private
sphere should be tempered by recognition of its significant limitations. State
and federal statutes address the informational privacy of consumers with
respect to certain invasive behaviors, but the protections they offer are
idiosyncratic. For example, information about the video cassette rental
72 (1993). While the right to privacy in the Rehnquist era has been "thus far and no further,"
the Court recently upheld the privacy rights of homosexuals in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct.
2472 (2003). Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy stated: "When homosexual conduct
is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to
subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and private spheres. The
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime." Id. at
2482.
17See Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001) cert. denied, 536 U.S. 915
(upholding the constitutionality of the privacy sections of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1681 (2000), by dismissing a First Amendment challenge to mailing list
regulations); Individual Reference Servs. Group, Inc. v. FTC, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C.
2001) (upholding the privacy regulations under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 6801 (2000) and stating that the regulations did not violate plaintiffs' right to free speech
under the First Amendment, as the regulations serve a substantial state interest, directly and
materially advanced that interest, and were no more extensive than necessary to do so); see
also, Kenro Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (rejecting a First
Amendment constitutional challenge to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47
U.S.C. § 227 (2000) and upholding the statute's ban on the transmission of unsolicited fax
advertisements). Privacy advocates have several future hurdles to overcome.
Recently the American Telemarketing Association launched challenges to the Federal
Trade Commission's (FTC) latest privacy rights effort-the "do not call" database. A
complaint was filed in federal court in Colorado challenging the "do not call" scheme on
First Amendment grounds. See Press Release, Am. Telemarketing Ass'n, ATA Launches
Legal Challenge Against New Rules (Jan. 3, 2003), at http://www.donotcall.com/
lawsuit.asp. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit, in Mainstream Marketing Services Inc. v. FTC,
358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), overturned a lower court's decision that invalidated the donot-call database on First Amendment grounds. These cases will be discussed in greater
detail in Part VII infra.
8 See Ann Davis, Data Collection Is Up Sharply Following 9/11, WALL ST. J., May 22,
2003, at B 1 (discussing government national security efforts and initiatives aimed at tracking
movements and personal backgrounds of everyday Americans).
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19
practices of consumers is protected by federal statute, but the ability of
satellite television networks to monitor and analyze viewing data is not. The
sharing of information about creditworthiness that is collected by "credit
reporting agencies" is regulated by state and federal statutes; but gathering and
distributing of financial information by other entities from bankruptcy filings or
20
allThere is no broad
court proceedings generally is not covered.
privacy. 21
to
rights
consumer
general
addresses
that
encompassing statute

B. The Nonprofit Privacy Gap
Absent from most available legal privacy protections, however, are rules
that protect the privacy of donors who make charitable gifts to donees,
22
particularly to nonprofit organizations. The major privacy protection rules
speak mainly to the regulation of the use by sellers or vendors of information
obtained from purchasers or consumers; they do not regulate the use by donees
of personal information they have about nonprofit members, clients, and
donors.23 Furthermore, the privacy constraints on commercial solicitation
generally do24 not apply with respect to activities by nonprofit solicitors and
As distinguished from the commercial context, infringement of
fundraisers.

19The Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000), prohibits disclosure of
consumer video rental records.
20 See Peter C. Alexander & Kelly Jo Slone, Thinking About the Private Matters in Public
Documents: Bankruptcy Privacy in an Electronic Age, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 437, 439 (2001)
(arguing for Congress to address the privacy of debtors whose financial information and
bankruptcy status is susceptible to public intrusion by anyone with access to the bankruptcy
court PACER web system); Mark D. Bloom et al., Reorganizing in a Fish Bowl: Public
Access vs. ProtectingConfidential Information, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 775 (1999).
A separate and distinct privacy issue in the bankruptcy arena is the legal treatment of a
corporate debtor's privacy policies in bankruptcy. How privacy policies are treated in
bankruptcy proceedings currently hinges on whether such policies are viewed as creating
contract rights or property rights. When courts perceive the debtor's privacy policies as a
contract obligation, thereby subjecting them to discharge in bankruptcy, consumer
expectations of privacy are usually compromised. For a comprehensive article on this recent
issue, see generally, Edward J. Janger, Muddy Property: Generating and Protecting
Information PrivacyNorms in Bankruptcy, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1801 (2003).
21See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
22 For purposes of this Article, donors should be considered de facto consumers,
who,
spontaneously or subsequent to solicitations, decide to make gifts to nonprofit organizations,
corporate or noncorporate, tax-deductible or otherwise. And donees are recipients of donated
funds who do not offer consideration in return for assets they receive from donors but are
often qualified to provide donors with deductions from their income taxes in proportion to
the size of their gifts. See generally BORIS I. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES, AND GIFTS 5 (1981).

23 For a more comprehensive discussion on the consumer/donor distinction see infra notes
78-91 and accompanying text. Unless otherwise indicated, this Article will include "clients"
and "members" under the heading of "donors."
24 The FTC has exempted solicitations inducing charitable contributions via outbound
telephone calls from the "do-not-call" registry provision of the Telemarketing Sales Rule
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the privacy of donors is largely unprotected.
Add to the unremediated infringement of the privacy interests of donors the
increasingly privileged treatment of nonprofit and for-profit telemarketing
rights; add again the increasing ease with which gathered information about
donors can be turned to business advantage; and compound with the

pervasiveness of nonprofit fundraising activities. The combined effect is the
generation of an explosive growth in the nonprofit exploitation of personal
information about donors. Rights, as the legal theorist Joseph Singer has
written, do not actually extend further than "the scope of the remedies the law
will grant to right-holders. ' 25 By this standard (except, as will be noted below,
for those rights that benefit donors incidentally because they apply to entire

types of business activity), today's donors to nonprofit organizations make their
gifts without specific privacy rights.
II. THE CONTROVERSIAL LIST TRADE

Trading in personal information about consumers and donors has become
pattern and practice. 26 "Data-mining" has become more valuable, in all
(TSR). See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Loopholes in the National Do-Not-Call Registry, at
http://www.donotcall.com/loopholes.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2004). Only the less restrictive
entity-specific "do-not-call" provision requiring telemarketers to maintain their own "donot-call" list and to honor consumers' requests to be placed on that list and receive no further
calls will apply to charitable solicitation telemarketing. See FTC Release, FTC Announces
Final Amendments to Telemarketing Sales Rule, Including National "Do Not Call" Registry
(Dec. 18, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/12/donotcall.htm.
25Joseph William Singer, StartingProperty, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 565, 575 (2002).
26The Minnesota Attorney General's website contains several illustrations of how prevalent
and sophisticated the trade in personal information has become in recent years:
One company maintains a database that operates twenty-four hours a day, gathering and
processing information on 95% of American households. For a price, it will sort information
based on income, lifestyle (outdoor, mechanic, intelligence, etc.), or even a profile of
"ethnics who may speak their native language but do not think in that manner."
Another company offers lists of people with particular medical conditions. In 1999, it
offered for sale nearly 50 lists of individuals suffering from different medical ailments. It
sells the names and addresses of 427,000 people who are clinically depressed, 1.4 million
women who have yeast infections, and 1 million individuals who have diabetes. It also sells
lists of people with Alzheimer's Disease, birth defects, Parkinson's Disease, and "physical
handicaps."
A New York company offers the names of high school students according to GPA,
religion, ethnicity, and SAT scores.
A hospital sells the names of its patients who may be eligible for Social Security
insurance to a lawyer.
No information appears to be too personal for companies to collect or too insignificant to
sell. In 1999, electronic research companies were selling unlisted phone numbers for $49,
social security numbers for $49, and bank balances for $45. A company will obtain another
person's driving record for $35, trace a cell phone call for $84, or create a list of stocks,
bonds, and securities for $209. This personal data is merged into a consumer tracking and
information system that becomes larger every day it is sold to whomever may be interested in
buying. Each piece of information gathered, stored, and sorted by these large databases
represents an erosion of your right to privacy.
Office of the Minnesota Attorney General, Guarding Your Privacy, at http://www.ag.state.
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respects, than ever: it is widely used by organizations to improve their own
operating results, and may be traded or sold by them for gain. An almost
endless variety of information is of interest: items such as the identity of
consumers and donors; their earnings; their net wealth; their general giving
practices; their history of giving to particular organizations; their friends and
associates; their estate plans; their publicly available addresses; their private
addresses; their internet, facsimile, telephonic, and wireless contact
information; their ages; their educational levels; their marital status; their
occupations; their height, weight, and other physical characteristics; their
religion; their ethnicity; 27 their gender; their credit standing; their volunteer
activity in philanthropic causes; their hobbies; their political affiliations; the
stores they shop in; the personal purchases they make; their newspaper and
magazine subscriptions; the location of their second homes; and much other
information. The acquisition and processing of this information has been
facilitated by the newer technologies, and serves the financial and missionoriented interests of nonprofits. There is also a benefit flowing to consumers
and donors through the intra-organizational sharing of information with third
parties. The retention and use of this information, however, also intrudes upon
privacy rights and heightens the likelihood that individuals will be barraged
with junk mail and spam,
embarrassed, annoyed, defrauded, or even will have
28
stolen.
identities
their
A. Profiling Simplified

The sophistication with which personal information is compiled and
analyzed has increased rapidly in the last decade. 29 The rise of information
mn.us/consumer/Privacy/GuardingYPrivacy/GYP_1 .htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
27 Regarding the collection of ethnic data, opponents of affirmative action programs in
California have sought to stop the dissemination of ethnic information by way of popular
initiative. In October 2002, Californians voted on a "Racial Privacy Initiative" that if passed,
would have barred state and local government entities from maintaining databases
containing ethnic information of citizens. This initiative that would have barred the
collection of ethnic information on forms involving school enrollment, government
contracting, and job applications, did not pass. See Robert Tomsho, Some Seek Ban on
Collection of Ethnic Data, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2003, at B 1.
28 The seriousness and increasing incidence of the identity theft crime has prompted the
President and several members of Congress to pursue a broad range of consumer-friendly
measures aimed at reducing the incidence of identity theft by curtailing the personal
information trade, particularly with respect to financial information. See Rebecca Christie,
Identit,-Theft Safeguards Proposed, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2003, at D3.
29 See, e.g., Sandra Byrd Petersen, Your Life As an Open Book: Has Technology Rendered
Personal Privacy Virtually Obsolete?, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 163 (1995); Paul M. Schwartz,
Privacy and Democracyv in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999) (describing the use
of the Internet in facilitating the personal information trade); Daniel J. Solove. Privacy and
Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV.
1396, 1398 (2001) (discussing the role of databases in the information trade and describing
the traders as being part of a "clandestine underworld"); Jeff Sovem, ProtectingPrivacy with
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technology, networking, and the Internet significantly expanded available
personal information. The proliferation of computers and sophisticated data
processing software has also encouraged gathering and dissemination through
sophisticated collection techniques, corporate outsourcing of data processing,
3
and the establishment of information service providers and clearinghouses. 0
Crucial to the marketing success of both for-profit and nonprofit
organizations is the cultivation and acquisition of lists. Corporations go as far
as to create a profile of individuals by compiling lists of people with particular
characteristics and purchasing histories. 31 Obtaining, refining, and exploiting
lists has become an economic consideration relevant to nearly every company's
bottom line-a significant expense for enterprises that market to consumers,
both for-profit and nonprofit, and a significant part of the income stream for
many of them as well.32
Companies and associations of all sizes seek out list brokers, rent lists, and
use those lists to solicit new members, donors, subscribers, clients, or
purchasers of nonprofit services. Larger organizations-nonprofit and forprofit-use their own databases to compile lists and then to "cross-market" by
soliciting persons who already have some association with the organization.
Lists usually qualify as depreciable assets for tax and accounting purposes, and
the expenses from the purchase of lists are frequently classified on corporate
and nonprofit ledgers against marketing and fundraising accounts.
Lists are readily compiled because almost all consumer and business
transactions leave behind some sort of electronic record. Sources of
information include credit card transactions, mortgage records, magazine
subscription information, birth records, warranty cards, purchase plans, and
driver registration records. 33 Marketing agencies and other similar entities
collect layers of information and form multiple profiles of individuals and their
"electronic persona[s]."3 4 Similarly, almost all nonprofit donations,
Deceptive Trade PracticesLegislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1305, 1307 (2001) (discussing

the different ways companies have acquired and disseminated personal information).
30

See Allen R. Grogan & Ron Ben-Yehuda, Outsourcing Data Processing Operations, 8

COMPUTER L. 1 (1991); see also John Markoff, Business Technology: For Shakespeare, Just
Log On, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1991, at D1 (describing data exchange networks). The fear that
databases would sophisticate the personal information trade was contemplated as early as the
1970s. See ALAN F. WESTIN & MICHAEL A. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY:
COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING, AND PRIVACY 3-5 (1972).
31See Sovern, supra note 29, at 1309.

32See id. at 1307. Interestingly enough, many European countries have attempted to curtail
these practices. Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom have broad
statutes that provide a general set of privacy rights applicable to the private sector. See A.C.
Evans, European Data Protection Laws, 29 Am. J. COMp. L. 578 (1991); see also Data
ProtectionRoundup, PRIVACY L. & Bus., July 1991, at 2-7.
33 See William J. Fenrich, Note, Common Law Protection of Individuals' Rights in Personal
Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 960 (1996).
34 See Steven A. Bibas, A ContractualApproach to Data Privacy, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 591, 606-07 (1994) (proposing a statute mandating that all consumer transactions
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membership subscriptions, opinion communications, and requests for services
leave behind some sort of electronic record. Sources of information include
pledges, membership applications, contribution forms, feedback forms,
fundraising replies, newsletter and magazine subscription forms and
applications, the registration of Internet browsing choices, and membership
surveys. The nonprofit "electronic persona" may be no less sophisticated and
complex than the commercial one.
The nature of profiles that are available to be purchased is often amusing
and sometimes alarming. For instance, one can purchase a list of people who
have purchased skimpy swim-wear, college students sorted by major, class
year, and tuition payment, men who had purchased fashion underwear, people
who have lost loved ones, medical malpractice plaintiffs, people who have been
arrested, high risk gamblers, and tenants who have sued landlords; the lists go
on and on.35 Even the list of lists available is voluminous. A marketing
directory describes more than one thousand lists that can be purchased. 36 As
one commentator noted, "the typical transaction between a merchant or seller
characterized as an exchange of goods or
and a consumer increasingly can be 37
services for money and information."
B. CharitableDonor Lists

Nonprofit corporations profit immensely from the sale and rental of
donor's personal information. One estimate of the amount raised from this
practice is between $800 million and $940 million yearly, 38 an amount intended
as a "conservative one." 39 Obtaining lists can cost nonprofits between $65 and
$125 per thousand names. 40 A list of 50,000 names is considered small. 4 1 As in
include terms giving consumers an opportunity to either opt-in or opt-out of secondary use of
personal information); Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of PerpetualSunlight: Privacy
as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (1996) (proposing
federal statute granting individuals property rights in their electronic personas).
35See Jeff Sovem, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fightfor Control of
PersonalInformation, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1033, 1034 (1999).
36 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontierfor
Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 202 n.29 (1992).
37Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of
Privacy, 84 GEO.L.J. 2381, 2402 (1996).
38See Brock N. Meeks, Tough Love for Charity Data: Do-gooders Don't When They Shop
for Your Privacy, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/6979654.asp (last visited April 13, 2002).
This estimate consists of charities selling "housefile" databases containing lists of donors,
their contact information, and the amount they previously donated.
39Id. The source of the estimate is a study by advocates who looked at the impact of possible
new legislation that requires nonprofits to obtain prior approval before selling personal
information, as this Article suggests.
40 See Constance Casey, The Doing Good Beat: Charities May Make More Money on Your
Name Than on Your Check, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERV., Oct. 5, 1999.
41See id. Interestingly, it is easier for an individual to gain access to a list of donors than it is
for a shareholder to obtain a list of fellow shareholders under New York law. A shareholder
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the consumer information trade, donor lists can contain names, addresses,
telephone numbers, and details about the amount and frequency of donations. 42
Nonprofits are not the only organizations that have access to many donor
lists which nonprofit organizations and fundraising consultants purvey. If anY
individual expresses an interest, lists compiled from nonprofit sources are
available for purchase through brokers or electronically. 43 Many nonprofits,
however, keep their lists to themselves and barter them or sell them on an
exclusive basis.
A driving force in the marketing practices of nonprofits is the highly
competitive nature among these organizations for every donation. While the
sale of donor lists raises high revenues, advocates of the practice argue that if
list selling were prohibited, it would be difficult to start new charities without
enormously high fundraising costs. Furthermore, an argument is made that list
trading can help educate the public about the work being done by nonprofits in
related fields. This argument is a tenuous justification, at best.
Some contend that when one gives a donation to a charity, the name and
personal information that comes with the donation is more valuable than the
donation itself.4 4 Many fundraisers believe that direct mail via the sharing and

renting of donor lists is essential to nonprofit fundraising.4 5 Charities offer their
donor lists to businesses looking for some of the forty million Americans who
make purchases by mail or respond to contribution requests. 46 The growth of
who desires access to a shareholder list must be seeking access in the best interests of the
corporation and not for his own personal motives. Corporations are permitted to deny a
shareholder access to shareholder lists
upon [the shareholder's] refusal to furnish to the corporation ... an affidavit that such
inspection is not desired for a purpose which is in the interest of a business or object other
than the business of the corporation and that he has not within five years sold or offered for
sale any list of shareholders of any corporation of any type or kind.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. § 624 (McKinney 2003). Similarly, under Delaware law stockholders have
the right to inspect the list of the company's stockholders only for "a purpose reasonably
related to the person's interest as a stockholder." DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2003).
42See Anthony Giorgianni, The Donor Name Game, THE CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Aug.
12, 1999, at 21.
43 For instance, anyone with a credit card can go to www.richlists.com and purchase a list of
donors who have contributed to Jewish, Catholic, children, cancer, and other nonprofit
causes. Only $105 can get you 1000 donors who have given within ninety days of your list
purchase. The Rich List company
provides a number of related services to make your order a "one stop" call. The list
representative will listen to your needs and suggest a list or maybe two. The company works
with a printer and can help you develop graphics, and copy. Additionally, The Rich List can
do merge purge, list cleaning & postal requirements, and manage your lists for rental. The
Rich List can also do telethons, raise money, exchange lists and provide statistical studies.
The Rich List Company, What Does the Rich List Company Do?, at
http://www.richlist.com/aboutrlc.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004). There are dozens of
similar companies that aid and abet in the practice of cultivating, selling, and trading of
donors' personal information.
44 See Giorgianni, supra note 42.
41 See id.
46 See id.
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the practice has nonprofits apprehensive about the possibility that their donors
will learn about the list trade and be offended.
It is important to note that some charities assert that they never sell lists
and that if they do engage in list sharing practices, they do so only with the
express consent of their donors. 47 For instance, the American Heart Association
(AHA) does not sell or trade its donor lists. Instead of selling, they rent their
lists to other health related organizations on a one-time basis. 48 The AHA
prominently asserts in its privacy policy that "[p]ermission is required before
the AHA discloses personal information to a third party." 49 For these
organizations, list selling or swapping can,50potentially, undesirably discourage
those who have made donations in the past.
Other nonprofits defend the practice by stating their list practices are
responsible. 51 Charities often refuse to sell their lists to groups whose material
they deem to be objectionable or inappropriate. 52 Nonprofits often refuse to sell
lists to competing organizations as well.53 Additionally, charities often "seed"
their lists with the personal information of people who work for the
organization or are closely connected to it. 54 This practice enables the nonprofit
groups to keep track of a how a list is being used and if the group that
purchased the list has improperly used it.
It is well known that for-profit organizations consider the skillful
exploitation of lists of prospective customers to be crucial to success in the
world of retail business. It is less well known, however, that the intensive
exploitation of lists of potential nonprofit charitable donors, subscribers, and
47See, e.g., American Heart Association, Policy on Collection and Use of Personal
Information, at http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier- 11404 (last visited,
Apr. 20, 2004).

48 See id. For our purposes, renting the list for a one-time purpose is still exposing the
personal information of charitable donors; therefore donors should be entitled to a clear and
conspicuous right to refuse its privacy policy.
49See id.

50 Indeed, there is a prevalent problem that the public's trust in nonprofits will diminish if
they continue the nonconsensual use and dissemination of donors' personal information. A
recent study conducted for the Better Business Bureau indicated that nine out of ten
Americans "think it is not okay for a charity to raise money by selling donors' names and
addresses to others." PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH Assocs., BBB WISE GIVING ALLIANCE
DONOR EXPECTATIONS SURVEY: FINAL REPORT 7 (2001), available at http://www.give.org/

news/Donor%20Expectations%20Survey.pdf. Moreover, "privacy concerns also rate as one
of the two most important reasons why people are reluctant to make charitable contributions
online." Id.
51 See Giorgianni, supra note 42.
52 See id.
53 For instance, the Disabled American Veterans exchanges lists with many organizations,
but not with other veterans groups. See id.
54 See RIEVA LESONSKY, START YOUR OWN BUSINESS: THE ONLY START-UP BOOK YOU'LL

EVER NEED (1998) (describing the list "seeding" process), excerpted portion of book
available at http://www.entrepreneur.com/Magazines/MA-SegArticle/0,1539,265000--- I,00.html.
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clients, is increasingly deemed indispensable to successful nonprofit revenue
generation. A recent conference sponsored by the Direct Marketing
Association, devoted to marketing by nonprofit organizations, emphasized the
importance of mining data to nonprofit success. At the conference, several
leaders of nonprofit organizations explained that the growth of their
organizations could not have been accomplished as successfully without the
skillful use of data collected by the organizations and of data rented,
55
exchanged, or purchased from other nonprofits.
III. CONCERNS ABOUT SHARING PERSONAL INFORMATION

Concern about excessive intrusions upon privacy resulting from the
gathering of personal information by nongovernmental entities is nothing
new. 56 As early as 1967, Professor Alan Westin issued a general warning about
the impact on freedom of data collecting, trading and sharing.57 As the practice
has become commonplace, as the industry of data collection has grown, and as
fundraising practices have become more and more sophisticated, American
consumers have become increasingly concerned about their perceived loss of
control over information. 58 The relatively young Internet medium in particular
55 There were several panels discussing the detailed exchange in donor personal information
including one devoted exclusively to donor list management. For information on the panels
and issues discussed at the DMA sponsored nonprofit conference, see 2004 Washington
Nonprofit Conference, Home Page, at http://dmany.convio.net/site/PageServer?pagename=
homepage (last visited Aug. 4, 2003).
56 See ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 33 (1967) ("In democratic societies there is a

fundamental belief in the uniqueness of the individual, in his basic dignity and worth as a
creature of God and a human being, and in the need to maintain social processes that
safeguard his sacred individuality.").
57 Id. An earlier warning was provided in Olmstead v. United States,
Protection against such invasion of 'the sanctities of a man's home and the privacies of life'
was provided in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by specific language. But 'time works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.' Subtler and more far-reaching
means of invading privacy have become available to the Government. Discovery and
invention have made it possible for the Government, by means far more effective than
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.
Moreover, 'in the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what
has been but of what may be.' The progress of science in furnishing the Government with
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be
developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can
reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home. Advances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of
exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.
277 U.S. 438, 473-74 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
58 A Time/CNN poll found that ninety-three percent of Americans believe that "companies
that sell information to others should be required by law to ask permission from individuals
before making the information available." Richard Lacayo, Nowhere to Hide, TIME, Nov. 11,
1991, at 34. More recently, a PCWorld.com poll inquiring into privacy issues raised by the
Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act,
found that sixty-three percent were either very concerned or extremely concerned about
having law enforcement scrutinize their Web habits. CNN.com, PC World Poll
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has made the personal information struggle more difficult for privacy
advocates, as it allows for easy access. For instance, with the click of a mouse,
one can purchase lists of anti-gun control contributors, donors to causes that aid
the mentally challenged, drug rehabilitation donors, ethnic contributors,
humanitarian donors, and even "fat cats, who have previously contributed to
both political parties. '59 There are literally dozens of websites that have
6°
The lists go on
complete lists of donor lists and their corresponding prices.
61
effort.
no
or
little
with
comes
and on, and their accessibility
A. Intrusions and Inaccuracies
Several obvious concerns center around violations of confidentiality that
are inherent to the compilation of lists without the listed parties' knowledge or
consent. While many organizations do indeed gather information with the
consent of individuals, consent may be obtained with different degrees of
meaningfulness and without providing specific knowledge of the purpose for
which information will be used.62 Individuals, furthermore, are frequently
unaware of the myriad of organizations that collect personal information for
commercial purposes without seeking consent. 63 Shadow groups and their
surreptitiously gathered lists of personal information are particularly troubling.
of
A related concern for consumers is the unnecessary or excessive acquisition
64
personal information. Information is often gathered "because it is there."
Another important concern with the collection of personal information is
accuracy.65 The activity of collecting and disseminating information is
inherently susceptible to error. Recording techniques, misleading information,
Highlights Privacy Concerns (2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/TECH/industry/10/08
/privacy.poll.idg/index.html. For further discussion on the PATRIOT Act's relation to
nonprofit context, see infra notes 176-85 and accompanying text.
59 See W.S. Ponton, Inc., Philanthropic Donor Lists, at http://www.geocities.com/wsponton/
pages/Olphilan (last visited Apr. 20, 2003).
60 See, e.g., The Rich List Company, Home Page, at http://www.richlist.com (last visited
Apr. 20, 2004); USALists.com, Home Page, at http://www.USALISTS.com (last visited

Apr. 20, 2004).

61See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
62 For

a discussion of meaningful consent in the context of patient privacy, see Helena Gail
Rubinstein, If I Am Only for Myself What Am I? A Communitarian Look at the Privacy
Stalemate, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 218 (1999) ("Without the ability to know and rely on
uniform privacy regulations, patients may lack the basis for meaningful consent to disclosure
of information. Lack of uniformity of privacy protections may adversely affect the integrity
of health data and the quality of care itself by undermining efforts to automate health
records.").
63 See generally ERIK LARSON, THE NAKED CONSUMER: How OUR PRIVATE LIVES BECOME
PUBLIC COMMODITIES (1992).

64Reidenberg, supra note 36, at 203.
65See Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development: Council Recommendation
Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data, Mar. 1981, 20 I.L.M. 422 [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
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and incomplete collecting together contribute to accuracy concerns. 66
Additionally, the duration of storage of gathered information raises concerns. 67
Information may be stored beyond the life cycle of the purpose for which it was
collected. Retention beyond such a time suggests that the information is being
used for purposes other than were originally contemplated. 68 Moreover, as time
goes by and the information ages, it may become obsolete or inaccurate.
B.

The Nonprofit Context

Awareness of the problem of list sharing with special reference to
nonprofit organizations has not been notable until recently. In particular,
concerns have increased in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 when
charitable organizations scrambled to collect funds aimed at assisting thousands
of people who were deeply affected by the catastrophe. 69 Families of those who
perished were typically designated as the intended recipients of extensive
charitable campaigns-but there were reports of victims who did not receive
any charitable assistance and reports of donors
who wished to know where their
70
donations were going but could not find out.
66
67

See id.
See id.; see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Multimedia as a New Challenge and Opportunity in

Privacy: The Examples of Sound and Image Processing,at http://www.datenschutzberlin.de/infomat/heft22/teil2.htm (Apr. 20, 2004).
68

See id.

Notwithstanding the September 11 tragedy, New Yorkers donate over $10 billion to
charity every year. See Office of New York State Attorney General, Charities, at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/charities.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
70 See Response by Charitable Organizations to the Recent Terrorist Attacks: Hearing
69

Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong.
(2001) (statement of Daniel Borochoff, President, American Institute of Philanthropy).
Indeed, Fox News' The O'Reilly Factor conducted a nightly segment interviewing
executives from nonprofit charities as well as congressional leaders and victims in need. This
news segment brought the importance of charitable accountability to the public perception.
O'Reilly was also criticized for inaccurately accusing the United Way of diverting charity
funds that were supposed to provide relief to September 11 victims. See Rational Radical,
Bill O'Reilly Is Guilty Once More of Sloppy, Misleading Journalism, This Time About the
United Way (2001), at http://www.therationalradical.com/dsep/bill-oreilly-united.htm. For
more on the struggle of major charities in the aftermath of September 11, see David Barstow
& Diana B. Henriques, A Nation Challenged: The Charities;I.R.S. Makes an Exception on
Terror Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at BI; David W. Chen, A Nation Challenged:
Charities; 9/11 CharitiesSet Cutoff Date For Applicants, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, at A1;
Aaron Donovan, Charity Donations in Month Long Campaign Total $35 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at B14; Daniel Henninger, Wonder Land: Charity Begins at Home,
Ends Up Nowhere, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2001, at A12; Diana B. Henriques, Charity
Overwhelmed in Bid to Meet Attack Victims' Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2002, at Al;
Stephanie Strom, FamiliesFret As CharitiesHold a Billion Dollars in 9/11 Aid, N.Y. TIMES,
Jun. 23, 2002, at A29. For a comprehensive discussion on all the legal issues arising out of
the charity controversy resulting from the September 11 attacks including suggestions for
how charities should handle future catastrophes, see Robert A. Katz, A Pig in a Python: How
the CharitableResponse to September 11 Overwhelmed the Law of Disaster Relief 36 IND.
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In an effort to better coordinate relief, representatives of the government
forcefully urged charities to share lists of their program's benefit recipients
with one another, and with the government, in order to diminish duplication
and to avoid the further alienation of givers. 71 The focus of concern was on the
sharing of lists of beneficiaries and not on the sharing of personal information
about donors. Still, the suggestion that major charities should be pressured to
share recipient lists, and that lists be shared without the consent of donors, has
generated criticism of the way some nonprofit organizations handle their
operational records and the information that they collect. 72
C. Voluntary Responses. Guidelines and Privac.v Policies
With the increased capabilities and actual practices of corporations in
compiling lists containing personal information, privacy concerns have become
important to consumers and charitable donors alike. 73 Marketing associations of
nonprofit and for-profit vendors, Internet watchdog groups, and charitable
solicitors have sought to address and allay these concerns through the
development of voluntary standards and practices. This private approach
exhorts organizations that gather personal information to develop, proclaim,
and explain rules regarding their use of the information.
Given the degree to which the Internet has facilitated invasion of privacy, it
is ironic but perhaps not surprising that Internet vendors and charitable
solicitors have taken a more visible stand than conventional marketers with
respect to their "privacy policies." Nearly every Internet website that solicits
commercial transactions or nonprofit contributions posts a "privacy policy"
somewhere. Privacy watchdog organizations and trade organizations,
furthermore, have established minimum disclosure practices for sites that wish
to advertise that their privacy policies are in compliance with watchdog or trade
association rules.
Adherence by organizations to the stated policies of watchdogs and trade
associations, however, has not been documented, and enforcement of the rules
L. REV. 251 (2003).
71See Diane Rezendes Khirallah, Charities in Need of IT-Vendors Collaborateto Build a
Central Database to Help Victims of the Sept. 11 Attack, INFO. WK., Nov. 19, 2001, at 20;
see, e.g., Paulette V. Maehara, Let Ethics Be Your FundraisingGuide, 54 ASS'N MGMT. 30,
32 (2002).

72See Khirallah, supra note 71 ("The key issue here is whether the personal information
about the recipients is used fairly." (quoting Jason Catlett, President of Junkbusters Corp., a
privacy consulting firm)).
73 Indeed, the dissemination of personal information has raised concerns about the prospect
of identity theft. The FTC has indicated that identity theft is its number one source of
consumer complaints. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Identity Theft Complaint Data: Figures and
Trends on Identity Theft, at http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
For a comprehensive discussion of the privacy failures of regulators as a reason for
increasing identity theft cases, see generally, SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE
DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2000).
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that are established is sporadic. Some organizations with highly responsible
Internet data collection policies, furthermore, have less responsible policies
with respect to other types of transactions with their customers and donors.74
The policies themselves vary in the degree to which they tolerate collection
and dissemination of information. Even the most ardent nonprofit privacy
proponents rarely completely prohibit the sharing of personal information. The
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, a "nonprofit consumer education, research and
advocacy program, '75 for example, maintains a website that states in its own
privacy policy that under no circumstance is the information it collects shared
with third parties, but its policy does not prohibit sharing information within
the organization. 76 The website of VolunteerMatch, a nonprofit organization
that helps match nonprofit organizations with volunteers, on the other hand,
needs to share the information it collects with others in order to pursue its
mission. Its elaborate policy statement declares that while the privacy of
website users is "important," the sharing of personal information is
indispensable to its mission:
Our ongoing commitment to the protection of your privacy is essential to
maintaining the relationship of trust that exists between VolunteerMatch and
all of our users ....
This notice applies to all information you submit to VolunteerMatch, whether
through the... Web site or through the Web site of one of our Partners. Please
note that we cannot be responsible for the information you submit directly to
third parties, including our Partners, who may have their own posted policies.
. . .The types of personal information we collect are: For Newsletter
Subscribers: First and Last Name, Email address; For Volunteers: First and
Last Name, Email address, Phone number, ZIP code, Comments about
opportunity optional; For Volunteers (with a personalized account): First and
74For instance, PC Connection, an Internet purveyor of computer and tech related goods
maintains one privacy policy for its web consumers and one for its print catalog requests.
When you visit our site: When you connect to our Web site, PC Connection's Web servers
use non-persistent cookies to collect your IP address. Non-persistent cookies do not reveal
your identity, they simply enable us to maintain custom settings and items in your shopping
cart while you browse. The non-persistent cookie is temporarily stored to memory and is
automatically discarded when you end your browser session.
When you request a catalog: You are automatically placed on our mailing list when you

submit a catalog request. In addition to receiving our catalogs, you may occasionally receive
special mailings from us and/or from reputable companies whose products may be of interest
to you.

PC Connection, Privacy Policy, at http://www.shop.pcconnection.com/WebcontentfLegal/Pri
vacyPolicy.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004). In the nonprofit arena, charities sometimes have
privacy guidelines for those who visit their websites and separate privacy policies for those
who donate funds. See, e.g., Partners International Harvest of Hope, Security/Privacy Policy,
at http://www.harvestofhope.org/index.cfin?FuseAction=Security (last visited Apr. 20,
2004).
75Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Home Page, at http://www.privacyrights.com (last visited
Apr. 20, 2004).
76 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Privacy Policy, at http://www.privacyrights.com/policy.
htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
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Last Name, Email address, Phone number, ZIP code, Comments about
opportunity (optional, Usemame and Password, Referral history, Customized
email preferences (optional), Resume; For Nonprofit Organizations:
Administrator information: First and last name, email, telephone number, ZIP
code, username and password. Organization Information: Name of
organization, contact information (including contact title, first and last name,
phone, street address and email), EIN/tax identification number, mission
statement, description of services, and minimum one category. Fax, web site
address, and directions to physical location optional. Opportunity Information:
Opportunity title, contact email, description, minimum one category and
location information .... Required skills, date, time, commitment information
and volunteer age/group size optional.
How We Use Information: We use the Information we collect about you to
facilitate the volunteering process and to provide information to you about
VolunteerMatch and related industry topics. We use return email addresses to
answer the email we receive. Please be aware that, to the extent required to
provide our services, we share your Information with volunteers, nonprofit
organizations, or our Partners, as applicable. For Newsletter Subscribers: ..
We do not, however, sell, rent or trade our volunteer, administrator, nonprofit,
or general newsletter email addresses to outside parties ....
Cookies: Cookies are tiny data files that Web sites commonly write to your
hard drive when you visit them so that they can remember you when you visit.
A cookie file contains information that can identify you anonymously and
maintain your account's privacy. Our site uses cookies to maintain a user's
identity between sessions so that
77 the site can be personalized based on user
preferences or a user's history.
Although the above policy indicates that personal information is not sold, there
are no limits upon who the nonprofit chooses as its partners or the fees that the
nonprofit may obtain by sharing with partners; nor are there limits on the use
the nonprofit or its partners may make of the information they collect.
Current voluntary approaches made by for-profit and nonprofit marketers,
in sum, have had a marginal impact on public awareness that information is
collected by marketers, but they have not been proven effective at disclosing or
restricting the concrete use being made of information.
IV. DONORS CONSIDERED AS CONSUMERS
The theory of the nonprofit corporation has difficulty incorporating the
proposition that donors should be considered consumers. After all, the typical
definition of a consumer transaction is one made for household or family
purposes. Donors, however, are typically defined as persons who make gifts for
the benefit of others rather than exchange transactions made in their self-

VolunteerMatch, Privacy Policy,
privacy.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
77

at

http://www.volunteermatch.org/about/legal/
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interest. 78 In the context of privacy protection, however, the strong similarities,
characteristics, and intentions charitable donors and consumers collectively
share, warrant their equivalence in legal terms in that context.
A.

Theoretical Considerations

Charitable donors may have varying and unidentifiable reasons for
donating money to charities.79 First and foremost, however, donors want their
donations to be utilized for the purpose that the charity purports that it will be
used. 80 Additionally, most donors prefer that the charitable goal be
accomplished at the lowest possible cost.81 Notwithstanding the compelling fact
that donors may have ulterior motives, 82 these descriptions firmly resemble
consumer characteristics. Like donors, consumers want the goods and services
they purchase to conform to their expectations and purported uses. Consumers
83
also desire to acquire goods or services at the lowest possible costs.
Furthermore, donors and consumers both face similar problems in
addressing grievances that surface through their transactions. Donors and
consumers are plagued by the problem of standing. Their right to sue is limited
in most respects. This results from the judiciary's unwillingness to recognize
the right to a citizen's suit when the attorney general is in a position to bring a
suit. 84 The general rights of both classes are poorly defined, and both groups

78Section1.170A-13(c)(7)(iv) of the Income Tax Regulations defines donor as "a person or
entity ...that makes a charitable contribution of property." 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(7)(iv)
(2004). There are many consequences beyond tax consequences, of course, which flow from
designating a transfer as a donation rather than as a sale. Courts have defined the essence of
a donation as an act of charity without consideration. In Jacobs v. North Jersey Blood
Center, for example, the court asked, "what is a charity?" 411 A.2d 210, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1979). The court in Ballentine v. Ballentine said that a "charity, in its legal sense,
may be more fully defined as a gift . . " 123 N.J. Eq. 577, 578 (N.J. 1938). A gift in
common parlance means to give or donate something to someone "for free." Webster's
Dictionary defines a "charity" as "an organization or institution engaged in the free
assistance of the poor, the suffering or the distressed" WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 378 (4th ed. unabridged 1976) (emphasis added). Implicit in
these definitions of charity is the concept that the donor may not "expect or receive anything
of value in return for the gift or assistance given." Id.
79 See Robert A. Katz, Can Principal-Agent Models Help Explain Charitable Gifts and
Organizations?,2000 Wis. L. REv. 1 (2000); see also Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs
and the Oversight of CharitableOrganizations, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 227 (1999).
80 See Manne, supra note 79, at 234.
81 See id.
82 itmay be to the benefit of charitable donors to donate money to a charity, regardless of
how efficiently the money is being used. A public showing of charity, tax benefits, or an
altruistic urge to donate may be what is sought by the donor. See id.
83 But cf Katz, supra note 79 (arguing that charitable donors do not consume or purchase
goods).
84 See Manne, supra note 79, at 234; see also NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF
FREEDOM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 1-14 (2001).
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85

are confronted with difficulties in monitoring the acts of private enterprises.
Indeed, defining donors as consumers for the purposes of consumer protection
legislation would grant private rights of action in many cases where standing to
sue would be unavailable.
The similarities that can be inferred from the actions of both consumers
and donors, along with the difficulties both contingents face, indicate the need
for reform at the federal level. Moreover, if the federal government wishes to
promote giving and robust growth in charitable contributions, charitable donors
probably should be protected more than consumers with respect to the
placement of their personal information on donor lists.
B. DecisionsAddressing the Donor/ConsumerDistinction

Few cases rationalize the distinction between consumers and donors that
have been implied by the language of the statutory provisions. One FTC case,
however, In re El Paso Energy,86 touches on this distinction in dicta. In
analyzing certain misrepresentations that occurred during the course of a
charitable solicitation, the court remarked on the likeness and differences of
consumers and charitable donors.
The FTC ruling emphatically proclaimed that there are "substantial
differences between selling goods and services and seeking charitable
donations." 87 The authority for this notion was the Supreme Court's treatment
of charitable solicitation under the First Amendment. Citing Village of
Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,88 which invalidated
charitable solicitation rules that might have otherwise passed muster if only the
regulation of commercial speech were involved, 89 the FTC concluded that the
85 See Manne, supra note
6

79, at 228.

8 No. C-3997, 2001 F.T.C. LEXIS 8 (F.T.C. Jan. 30, 2001).

7Id. at *12.
88444 U.S. 620 (1980).
89As Justice White stated,
[C]haritable appeals for funds, on the street or door to door, involve a variety of speech
interests
... that are within the protection of the First Amendment ....Soliciting financial
support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable regulation but the latter must be undertaken
with due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with
informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for
particular views on economic, political or social issues, and for the reality that without
solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease ....
Id. Along the same lines, see Secretary of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947,

962 (1984), which held that charitable fundraising constitutes speech under the First
Amendment.
These holdings are distinguishable from the donor list context. In the donor list context,
charities are misappropriating the donor's personal information rather than engaging in doorto-door solicitation in furtherance of their message. The latter inherently provokes First
Amendment protections while the former has no relationship with First Amendment activity.
Recently, the Supreme Court limited Schaumberg's application to charitable solicitation.
Where the solicitation is false, misleading, or is not related to First Amendment activity, the
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sale of goods and services are often subject to separate statutory and regulatory
90
schemes, and are therefore "different forms of activity."
The FTC's analysis is inapplicable to the context of nonconsensual selling
of donor lists. Whether the personal information in a list was acquired in
connection with a gift or a purchase, the most salient fact is that information
obtained by either a seller or a donee may have been obtained with an
expectation that it would be be kept private. Given the purposes the FTC should
be protecting, namely, the rights of individuals to be free from "deceptive" or
"unfair" practices, donors and consumers alike both face virtually identical
91
problems with respect to the issue of informational privacy.
C.

Weighing Consumer and DonorInterests in List Sharing

As a group, consumers have reasons not only to be concerned about the
information trade, but also to welcome benefits from it. Many consumers make
purchases in response to mailings, online offerings, and telephone
solicitations. 92 Consumers who transact in these ways benefit when merchants
correctly identify their interests. For instance, major computer catalog sellers
often send unsolicited e-mails to individuals who they have reason to believe
may be interested in purchasing computers. Would-be purchasers need look no
further than their e-mail inbox for a favorable deal. An e-mail of this sort can
save the consumer time and money by lowering search costs, as the consumer
will not have to travel to a computer vendor.93 Proponents of a broad and
permissive trade in information argue that benefits to potentially interested
consumers outweigh impositions on uninterested consumers.94
solicitation is not "place[d] under the First Amendment's cover." Illinois ex rel. Madigan v.
Telemarketing Assocs., 123 S. Ct. 1829, 1831 (2003).
9
oIn re El Paso, No. C-3997, 2001 F.T.C. LEXIS 8, at * 12.
91Recently, in Madigan v. TelemarketingAssociates, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1829 (2003), in a case
involving fraudulent misrepresentation of charitable funds, the Supreme Court's analysis
suggests that the Court may consider regulatory actions in the area of misrepresentation to
donors more favorably. Along these lines, the Court upheld the government's right to
"vigorously enforce antifraud laws to prohibit professional fundraisers from obtaining
money on false pretenses or by making false statements." Id. at 1839. Moreover, the Court
upheld the right of states to "maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false and
misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be
used."Id at 1843.
92 See Bibas, supra note 34, at 599 ("Many consumers enjoy receiving mailings and
shopping at home.").
93See Daniel Klein & Jason Richner, In Defense of That Pesky Junk Mail, CHI. TRIB., Apr.
20, 1992, at 19 ("Direct mail is especially important for customers who do not live in a
major metropolitan area, or who have a physical or health disability that makes shopping and
travel difficult.").
94See, e.g., Information Privacy:HearingBefore the House Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade
and Consumer Protection, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Jerry Cerasale, Senior Vice
President, Government Affairs, Direct Marketing Association, Inc.) (arguing that companies
can effectively address and protect consumer privacy), availableat http://energycommerce.
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D. The Virtues of Consumer Profiling
It has been argued that the greater availability of information about
consumers actually reduces the quantity of junk mail. The more sellers and
merchants learn about consumers, this argument goes, the better refined their
marketing and solicitation efforts will be. 95 Subsequently, as a result of
narrower target marketing schemes, unwanted solicitations will be reduced. If
sellers are not allowed to create consumer profiles, they may respond by
soliciting all consumers.
As states consider limits on the trade of personal information, lobbyists
have pursued this line of argument forcefully. Several states have recently
considered enacting privacy rules that would restrict the construction of profiles
without consumer consent, and which would be tougher than those at the
federal level.96 Vermont, New Mexico, and California are moving ahead with
tougher financial privacy rules.97 Lobbyists who represent the financial and
house.gov/107/hearings/06212001Hearing292/Cerasale464.htm.
95See Dee Prigden, How Will Consumers be Protected on the Information Superhighway?
32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 237, 240 (1997); see also Statement of the Federal Trade
Commission on "Online Profiling: Benefits and Concerns" Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 107th Cong. (2000) (remarks of Jodie Bernstein,
Director,
Bureau
of
Consumer
Protection),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/06/onlineprofile.htm.
WORKSHOP ON CONSUMER

But cf FED. TRADE COMM'N, PUBLIC

INFORMATION PRIVACY SESSION THREE:

CONSUMER ONLINE

PRIVACY, VOLUME 3 (1997), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/privacy/wkshp97/volume3.pdf
(quoting Jason Catlett, Chief Executive Officer, Junkbusters Corp., who states that ten
thousand pieces of spam cost one dollar to send).
96 See Russell Gold, States Mull Opt-In, Opt-Out Rules, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2002, at B8.
97See id. Recently, a California state senator's attempt to expand financial privacy
was
blocked in the California state assembly. Constituents are currently attempting to pass the
bill into law via popular initiative in March 2004. See Steve Geissinger, Lawmakers Kill
Speier's Financial-PrivacyBill; Supporters Say They Will Take Fight to the Ballot Box, SAN
MATEO COUNTY TIMES, July 9, 2003; Carolyn Said, Privacy Bill Backers Ready to Go to
Ballot: Pass Law or Face Initiative, They Tell Legislature, SAN FRAN. CHRON., July 31,
2003, at Al. The initiative calls for a complete "opt-in" requiring banks to procure
permission from consumers before disseminating their personal information to telemarketers
and the like. See Editorial, Privacy Revolution is Here, SAN FRAN. CHRON., July 31, 2003, at
A20.
As of February 25, 2002, the New Mexico Statutes were amended, granting individuals
greater protection of their nonpublic personal health information and personal financial
information. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-3 (Michie 2003), available at http://www.
insurcompweek.com/pdf/0114_nm.privacy-regs.pdf. The new laws were intended to afford
individuals greater privacy protections than those provided in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
15 U.S.C. § 6716 (2000). Vermont also followed through by passing similar opt-in
requirements that have insurance and financial services corporations scrambling to comply.
Prudential Securities was forced to add the following footnotes to its national general notice
to comply with the Vermont opt-in requirement: "We will not disclose information about our
Vermont customers and former customers to non-Prudential businesses for their use in
offering their products or services to you." Privacy Regulation Report, 2002 Privacy Notice
Survey:
Custom
Preferences
& State
Requirements
Drive
Change,
at
http://www.privacyregulation.com/jsp/article.jsp?articleid=26839 (last visited Aug. 5,
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insurance industries have argued that tougher privacy rules will inevitably stop
the flow of efficient marketing. 98 They further assert that "if [companies] can't
use customer data to target their advertising, [they will resort] to more mass
mailings and telemarketing." 99 Ultimately they suggest that privacy laws do not
00
stop marketing.1
These arguments have been criticized by privacy advocates who counter
that if less privacy actually benefited consumers by reducing their junk mail,
consumers would, if given a choice, choose to surrender their privacy.101
Furthermore, the industry's argument against limits assumes that businesses
would not respond to the loss of information by implementing a more costefficient alternative to direct solicitation efforts.10 2 The ultimate fallacy of this
argument is that it presupposes10 3that alternate methods of reducing unwanted
solicitations cannot be devised.
The dissemination of personal consumer information via computer
databases theoretically makes it possible to sell products at lower prices. 10 4 If
the cheapest way for a seller to market products is by utilizing a computer
database, this decreases the marketing costs of the seller, which theoretically
will decrease the costs for consumers.' 0 5 Indeed, the return for direct mail
advertising is asserted to be more than twice that of more expensive television
commercials.' 0 6 If sellers were required to market to consumers only by using
2003).
98See Gold, supra note 96.
99Id.

'ooSee id.
101 See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REv.

1193, 1217-18 (1998).

102See Sovern, supra note 35, at 1050.
03 See id.

104See, e.g., David Klein, Comment, Keeping Business Out of the Bedroom: Protecting
Personal Privacy Interestsfrom the Retail World, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
391, 393 n. 10 (1997) ("Some companies can offer discounts on their goods when they utilize
personality profile lists, because they send fewer mail advertisements, and they send them
only to those persons who are likely to purchase the product.").
105 See id. In the alternative, Ian Ayres and Matthew Funk recently recommended economic
disincentives to telemarketing invasions of privacy:
[W]e would require ...standardized, initial disclosure that a call is an unsolicited
The intermediaries could
telemarketing call and the amount of per-minute compensation ....
also play a roll in verifying to the consumer that a particular telemarketing call was in fact
paying compensation ....Indeed, far from the status quo, a telemarketer-choice regime with

automated filtering by households is likely to be largely equivalent to a household-choice
regime with automated filtering by telemarketers ....Each month's phone bill will disclose
the telemarketing credits that the household receives (and might disclose how the consumer
could vary the default price).
Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 112-16 (2003). We
will discuss this "market theory of privacy" and the accompanying economic disincentives
as applied to the nonprofit context infra at Part VII.
106
See Susan Headden, The Junk Mail Deluge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 8, 1997, at
42 (stating that ten dollars is generated for every one dollar spent on direct mail advertising).
The average mailing generates ten times the response produced by a newspaper
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expensive means of communication such as television, radio, and newspaper
advertising, sellers would have to increase the price of the products or forgo
selling the products altogether. 10 7 Consumers may also benefit from a potential
lender's access to financial information because a lender's ability to determine
a consumer's creditworthiness allows the lender to customize interest rates on
loans. 108
Although not a benefit to consumers, there is another interest that should
be factored into any analysis of the appropriate restrictions on marketing and
list sharing in the interest of privacy rights. Sellers have a legitimate interest in
being able to inquire about all aspects of the sales environment in which they
operate. The interest of companies in gathering information about the tastes and
preferences of consumers109is crucial in their ultimate quest for maximizing
future streams of revenue.
Ultimately, sellers seek personal information about potential buyers as part
of their own solicitation efforts."10 The compilation and sale of lists is big
business, and yet the costs associated with this business are low. Once a list
exists the cost of maintaining it is relatively inexpensive.11' Some companies
earn more from selling customer lists and profiles than selling their own goods
and services. 1 2 Indeed, some companies are pursued by merger partners
because of the quality and quantity of their lists. 113
In sum, the benefits of the information trade to sellers are tremendous. A
1996 Gallup poll found that seventy-seven percent of companies use marketing
techniques that involve consumer lists and target marketing. 1 4 The total
amount spent on mailing lists in this country is staggeringly approximated at $3

advertisement and one hundred times the response from a television commercial. See Jim
Smolowe, Read This!!!!!!!!, TIME, Nov. 26, 1990, at 65.
107

Additionally, Stephen Bibas claims that mail order selling reduces damage to the

environment because it enables people to shop without traveling. See Bibas supra note 34, at
600. But cf, Smolowe, supra note 106.
108 See Judith B. Prowda, Report: A Lawyer's Ramble Down the Information Superhighway:

Privacy and Security of Data, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 738, 751 (1995) (noting claims of
consumer benefits based on wide dissemination of personal information).

109 See Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Legitimate Business Interest: No End in Sight? An Inquiry into

the Status of Privacy in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 77, 88 (1996) (comparing the
relationship of sellers and buyers to that of anglers and trout).
11 See id.

See Karlene Lukovitz, Cashing in on Renting Your Lists, FOLIO, Oct. 1985, at 106.
112 See
113

See

Headden, supra note 106, at 45; see also Smolowe, supra note 106.
PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL

R.

REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW

336-37 (1996)

(stating that pharmaceutical company merged with mail-order pharmacy to obtain the latter's
detailed personal information records. Additionally, a prescription drug benefits plan
manager sought to purchase a corporation that maintained a prescription drug database and
owned two pharmacies).
114 See BD. OF GOVERNORS

OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO CONGRESS CONCERNING

THE AVAILABILITY OF CONSUMER IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

&

FINANCIAL FRAUD

availableat http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/privacy.pdf.

7 (1997).
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billion per year. 115 According to one estimate, consumer list direct marketing
potentially generated $30 billion in sales by the end of the 2002 fiscal year.116
The industry of compiling consumer and donor lists and profiles employs more
than eighteen million people," 7 and the business is growing at a pace estimated
at twice that of the United States' gross domestic product.1 8
Trade of information does have certain undeniable benefits, but those
benefits are asymmetrically distributed toward sellers and toward those who are
interested in receiving unsolicited marketing appeals. These benefits do foster a
more efficient relationship between consumers and sellers, but the extent of the
benefits should not be exaggerated.
E.

Virtues in the Nonprofit Context

The detriments resulting from the dissemination of charitable donor lists
are apparent. The donor, who by virtue of her donation injects her personal
information into the stream of commerce, is continually harassed by companies
and organizations that receive her information without her consent. This is
essentially the identical problem that consumers are confronted with. Some
charities have justified the practice on the theory that if donors contribute to
one charitable organization, they will not mind being solicited by another.
Just as the sale of information has its benefits for consumers, the
formulation of a donor database or list, and its subsequent sale or rental, has
purported benefits as well. As mentioned, the donor lists give charities the
ability to market their causes and pour in revenues. Indeed, there are often
charitable donors who donate to fixed charities on a monthly or yearly basis.
The charities may give donors the opportunity to give to similar causes that
donors may indeed want to know about. Nonprofits feel that making the lists
available to one another is an essential transaction that allows them to find
people who are most likely to give. 119
Additionally, if charities are able to use donor lists in efficient marketing, a
greater amount of money can theoretically be used to help people actually in
need. In this respect, such marketing may actually be beneficial.

115

See Fenrich, supra note 33, at 956.
Protecting Consumers Against Cramming and Spamming: Hearings Before the

116 See

Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade & Consumer Prot. of the House Comm. on Commerce,
105th Cong. 9-104 (1998) (testimony of Jerry Cerasale, Senior Vice President, Government
Affairs, Direct Marketing Association, Inc.).
117 See Fenrich, supra note 33, at 956.
18 See ARTHUR M. HUGHES, THE COMPLETE DATABASE MARKETER 5 (rev. ed. 1996) ("It is
and will continue to be the hottest growth area in advertising for the foreseeable future").
119See Giorgianni, supra note 42, at 21.
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V. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES

In the United States, the right of nongovernmental entities to compile and
distribute personal information is broadly established. 120 Not only are there
acknowledged benefits to the aggregation of personal information about
consumers for marketing purposes,' 21 but there is also, as a general matter, no
right to control the private use of personal information that is outside one's own

possession. 122
The importance of privacy concerns, however, in combination with the

inadequacy of voluntary approaches, has provoked government regulation of
certain types of information gathering and list-sharing activities. On the
commercial side, the sale of personal information that is gathered in connection
with commercial transactions has been restricted through the establishment of
certain rules aimed at promoting accuracy, preventing discrimination,
diminishing harassment, and preserving the confidentiality of certain types of
records.
A. IndividualizedRegulatory Constraints
In the words of Professor Joel Reidenberg, "the American legal system
120See, e.g., In re Doubleclick Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(dismissing a complaint alleging the nonconsensual collection of personal information). In
Doubleclick, the court emphatically stated "although demographic information is valued
highly . . the value of its collection has never been considered a economic loss to the
subject." Id. at 525; see also Tarver v. Smith, 402 U.S. 1000, 1000 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "[t]he ability of the Government and private agencies to gather,
retain, and catalogue information on anyone for their unfettered use raises problems
concerning the privacy and dignity of individuals."); McNally v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 532
F.2d 69, 76 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that only the most intimate aspects of people's lives have
been held to be constitutionally protected); Fenrich, supra note 33; Jonathan P. Graham,
Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of PersonalInformation, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 1395 (1987); Marsha Cope Huie et al., The Right To Privacy In PersonalData: The
EU Prods The U.S. And Controversy Continues, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 391 (2002);
Tracie B. Loring, Comment, An Analysis of the InformationalPrivacy Protection Afforded
by the European Union and the United States, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 421 (2002).
Additionally, it should be noted here that the European Union and the United States
drastically differ in the regulation of privacy and personal information. While the United
States has enacted piecemeal legislation, the European Union countries have adopted a
comprehensive directive. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 October 1995 seeks to offer broad protections to individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. The Directive went into
effect in 1998. EU Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October, 1995, reprintedin PETER P. SWIRE &
ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE,
AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIvE 213-46 app. A (1998).
121See supra notes 95-118 and accompanying text.
122See Joel Reidenberg et al., Panel III: The Privacy
Debate: To What Extent Should
Traditionally "Private" Communications Remain Private on the Internet?, 5 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA& ENT.

L.J. 329, 333 (1995),
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responds incoherently and incompletely to the privacy issues raised by existing
information processing activities in the business community." ' 123 The most
significant legal rules at the federal level are in the areas of video and cable
privacy, consumer medical records, children's online privacy, and bank and
financial records. 124 Congressional activity with regard to personal information
protection has been largely reactive, targeting industries on a case-by-case
125
basis, and often responding after extreme instances of privacy infringement.
Congress recently has recognized a need to explore the possibility of further

regulation of personal information gathering practices by for-profit entities.' 26
It has refused, however, to create a coherent response based on fundamental
principles and policies. Consequently, while some personal information cannot
be sold, most commercial uses for personal information are not regulated at all,
and the problem of donor privacy has, except for recent security
provisions of
27
the USA PATRIOT Act, ignored charitable donors entirely.1
Former Vice President Al Gore expressed his view of the problem during
the last election: "We live," he said, "in a nation where people can get access to
your bank account and your medical records more easily than they can find out
what movies you rent at the video store.' 1 28 This observation is still accurate.
1.

Video and cable privacy.

The regulation Al Gore was speaking of involves the home entertainment
industry. 129 The Video Privacy Protection Act prohibits the disclosure of titles
of particular videos rented by any customer. However, the law does permit
disclosure of customer names and addresses as well as subject matter interest
123 Reidenberg, supra note 36, at 199.
124 See Sovern, supra note 29, at 1306.
125See Reidenberg, supra note 36, at 209 (describing the "mosaic" approach to privacy

concerns that responds to narrow problems).
126 Representative Billy Tauzin (R.-La.), who chairs the full Committee on Energy and
Commerce, cited "a need to explore additional legislative efforts that will address an
apparent failure in the marketplace to protect consumers' privacy." Challenges Facing the
Federal Trade Commission Before the House Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and
Consumer Prot., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Rep. Billy Tauzin, Chair, House Comm.
on Energy and Commerce), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/Hearings/
11072001 hearing403/TheHonorableBilly Tauzin.htm.
127 For a more plenary discussion on the USA PATRIOT Act in this context, see infra notes
176-85 and accompanying text.
128 Sheryl G. Stolberg, Privacy Concerns Delay Medical IDs, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1998, at
A10 (quoting Former Vice President Al Gore). Gore was referring to a federal statute that
makes it illegal to disseminate information about what videos people rent. This statue will be
discussed immediately infra.
129 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (2000). The scope of § 2710 applies to consumers, and would
not govern disclosing gifts of videotapes. -§27 10. Wrongful disclosure of video tape rental
or sale records. (a) Definitions. For purposes of this section-(1) the term 'consumer' means
any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider."
Id. § 2710.
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for marketing purposes, provided that the consumer is given the option to opt30
Civil remedies and statutory damages are
out of such an arrangement.'
13 1
individuals.
available to aggrieved
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1988 similarly purports to
address the problem of informational privacy where cable communications
media are involved.' 32 Subscriber information and viewing habits may be
disclosed to third parties only with the subscriber's consent or for a legitimate
business activity related to the service. 133 A mailing list can be disseminated if
134
each subscriber has an opportunity to opt-out. These statutes demonstrate the
industry-specific nature of the federal government's response to consumer
privacy concerns.
2.

Consumer medical records.

The Clinton Administration's Department of Health and Human Services
attempted to develop privacy regulations as required by the passage of the
35
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).'
Indeed one of the delineated purposes of HIPAA was "to protect and enhance
the rights of consumers by providing them access to their health information
and controlling the inappropriate use of that information."' 136 Generally,
healthcare consumers are able to require healthcare institutions to give patients
130 See id. § 2710(b)(2)(D)(i)-(ii).
'3'See

id. § 2710(c).

13247 U.S.C. § 551(b) (2000). The privacy related subsections of the statute provide, in

relevant part, that:
(1) a cable operator shall not use the cable system to collect personally identifiable
information concerning any subscriber without the prior written or electronic consent of the
subscriber concerned.
(2) A cable operator may use the cable system to collect such information in order to
(A) obtain information necessary to render a cable service or other service provided by the
cable operator to the subscriber; or
(B) detect unauthorized reception of cable communications .....
(c)(l) a cable operator shall not disclose personally identifiable information concerning any
subscriber without the prior written or electronic consent of the subscriber concerned.

Id.
'

33

Id. § 551(b)(1).

§ 551(c)(2)(C).
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of

"3 Id.
'3

18, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
136
See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160, 164). Among the other purposes
of the Act are "to improve the quality of health care in the U.S. by restoring trust in the
health care system among consumers, health care professionals, and the multitude of
organizations and individuals committed to the delivery of care" and "to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of health care delivery by creating a national framework for
health privacy protection that builds on efforts by states, health systems, and individual
organizations and individuals." Id.
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notice of their information practices, and enable individuals to gain access to
their own medical records. 137 The privacy standards apply to "covered entities"
that are identified as "health care providers," "health plans," and "health care
clearinghouses." 13 8 Patients who receive services at both nonprofit and forprofit health care providers are covered by the Act, although the personal
information that health care providers collect from donors is not protected.
The HIPAA privacy standards purport to create a national framework for
health privacy protection to enhance the protection of patient medical and
"protected health information."' 139 The privacy standards regulate the internal
40
use and external disclosure of health information and medical records.
Included are new special rules for obtaining patient consent and authorization
to use and disclose medical information. 4 1 Additionally, individual patients
will have the right to inspect or obtain records of their own healthcare
information and amend any inaccurate information. 42 Further, patients will
have the opportunity to request a restriction of the use or disclosure of their
records for treatment, payment, and health care operations, and to receive
notice of a health care provider's privacy practices. 43 These privacy measures

137 See id. While most Americans deem their medical information to be
most sensitive, this
information is widely available. See Robert W. Woody, Health Information Privacy: The
Rules Get Tougher, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 211, 213 (2001-2002). Unfortunately the noble
Hippocratic oath is mere ideology. The oath reads as follows: "Whatsoever things I see or
hear concerning the life of men, in my attendance on the sick or even apart therefrom, which
ought not be noised abroad, I will keep silence thereon, counting such things to be as sacred
secrets." availableat http://www.epic.org/privacy/medical/.
118 45 C.F.R. § 164.104 (2004). The definitions of these terms as provided in the Act are of
significant importance.
139What medical information is subject to the Act has been an increasingly complex inquiry.
'Health information' includes any oral or recorded information that is created or received by
a covered entity or certain other entities and that relates to the past, present, or future: (1)
physical or mental health or condition of an individual and the provision of health care to an
individual; or (2) payment for the provision of health care to an individual. 'Protected health
information' is that subset of health information to which the rules' restrictions on use and
disclosure apply. Protected health information is: (1) 'individually identifiable health
information' that is transmitted or maintained in electronic media or in any other form or
medium. 'Individually identifiable health information' is health information that identifies an
individual or that can be used to identify the individual (including demographic information).
Protected health information does not include health information contained in certain
education records and student medical records.
Woody, supra note 137, at 220 (citations omitted).
140 Another healthcare privacy issue is genetic profiling. The use of genetic data to
discriminate in both employment and health insurance is troubling to lawmakers, consumers,
and healthcare professionals, alike. For a discussion of potential problems with genetic
profiling and an example of how a railroad company used the procedure to asses the viability
of medical claims by its employees, see Dana Hawkins, The Dark Side of Genetic Testing,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 19, 2001, at 30.
141It is important to note that the consent requirement may be removed due to current
proposed changes to the regulations.
142 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.520 (2004).
143 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2004).
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were effective as of April 2003.144
While HIPAA seems like a major shift towards protecting the private
information of healthcare consumers, it has several significant shortcomings.
The Act allows researchers and public authorities to access protected health
45
This has led
information without patient authorization and consent.
commentators and privacy advocates to believe that there is a significant
chance for challenges invoking the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of
patients. 146 Additionally, while the rules create an administrative enforcement
mechanism, they do not create a federal private cause of action for individuals
who are injured by a violation of the rules.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the limitation of coverage to
specifically enumerated "covered entities" shields many entities that have had a
field day in disseminating personal information. 147 For instance, "Business
Associates" of covered entities-businesses that provide administrative,
management, legal, accounting, and other oversight services to healthcare
providers and health plans-would not be subject to legal sanction.' 48 This is
troubling because these precise associates are the ones who are mostly
responsible for the dissemination of medical information without patient
consent. Thus, while HIPAA does afford consumers some protections, it falls
short of taking a significant step to protect the private medical information of
patients. 149
3.

Children'sprivacy online.

Children have become increasingly vulnerable to privacy threats,
particularly with their increased use of the Internet. In 1998, Congress enacted
the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 150 which regulates

144
See Andrew S. Krulwich & Bruce L. McDonald, The Vulnerability of HIPAA Regulations

to First and Fourth Amendment Attack An Addendum to "Evolving ConstitutionalPrivacy
DoctrinesAffecting HealthcareEnterprises," 56 FOOD DRUG L.J. 281, 282 (2001).
141
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2004).

146 See Krulwich & McDonald, supra note 144, at 303 (arguing that "[t]he provisions
allowing release of protected health information without the individual's authorization to
government officials for law enforcement, public health, and research purposes do not take
into account the individual patient's Fourth Amendment rights to protect medical
information...").
147
For a more comprehensive discussion of the Act's shortcomings
in these respects, see
generally, Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the
Common Law, 33 RUTGERs L.J. 617, 619 (2002).
148See Laura Landro, Health-PrivacyAct Poses Problems, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 24, 2003, at
D3.
149But cf Susan M. Gordon, Privacy Standards of Health Information: The Misnomer of

Administrative Simplification, 5 DEL. L. REV. 23, 56 (2002) (arguing that the "privacy
regulations will do much to improve the confidentiality of medical records").
"' 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2000).
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online information collected from children less than thirteen years of age. t51
Congress was prompted to regulate this information because young children are
unaware of the privacy risks involved in revealing personal information and
Internet websites were actively collecting data from web surfers.' 5 2 The Act is
designed to stop unfair and deceptive acts and practices involving the
disclosure and collection of personal information by and from young
53
children.1
The Act is broad in scope, applying to "any person who operates a website
[sic] located on the Internet or an online service and who collects or maintains
personal information from or about the users ...where such website or online
service is operated for commercial purposes ....
The Act requires parental
permission before a website can gather a child's personal information. Further,
the Act includes mechanisms for controlling access to personal information and
enforcing its proper use. The FTC is empowered to implement and enforce
COPPA by its Section Five jurisdiction. 155 In addition, § 6504 of COPPA
authorizes state attorneys general to enforce compliance by filing actions in
federal court after giving the FTC prior written notice.156
COPPA requires that a website obtain "verifiable parental consent" before
collecting information from a child. 57 To obtain verifiable parental consent, a
website operator must make:
[A]ny reasonable effort (taking into consideration available technology),
including a request for authorization for future collection, use, and disclosure
described in the notice, to ensure that a parent of a child receives notice of the
operator's personal information collection, use, and disclosure practices, and
authorizes the collection, use, and disclosure, as applicable, of personal
151See id. Pursuant to COPPA, the FTC issued a rule implementing the requirements of the
legislation. See 16 C.F.R. § 312.1 (2004). For an in-depth discussion of the Act, see
generally, Anita L. Allen, Minor Distractions: Children, Privacy and E-Commerce, 38
Hous. L. REv. 751 (2001).
152 The legislative history suggests that the purpose of the legislation was
to enhance parental involvement in a child's online activities in order to protect the privacy of
children in the online environment; (2) to enhance parental involvement to help protect the
safety of children in online fora such as chatrooms, home pages, and pen-pal services in
which children may make public postings of identifying information; (3) to maintain the
security of personally identifiable information of children collected online; and (4) to protect
children's privacy by limiting the collection of personal information from children without
parental consent.
144 CONG. REc. S11,657 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Sen. Bryan); see also Joe
Salkowski, Privacy-Protection Policy For Kids Can Benefit Adults, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 1,
1999, at 2 (explaining benefits to adults of new child privacy regulations).
153 See generally 144 CONG. REc. S11,657 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Sen. Bryan)
(explaining goals and development of COPPA legislation).
154 See COPPA, 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000) (defining term "operator").
155 For a discussion of Section Five jurisdiction of the FTC, see infra notes 203-09 and
accompanying text.
156 Another enforcement procedure is found in the safe harbor rules that subject participants
to a yearly audit of their information practices. See 16 C.F.R. § 312.10 (2004).
57 COPPA, 15 U.S.C. § 6501(2)(A) (2000).
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information and the subsequent
58 use of that information before that information
is collected from that child.'

Like the other federal legislation discussed in this Article, COPPA is
inadequate in many respects. The Act only protects children under the age of
thirteen and does not protect older youths that face similar privacy concerns

and are certainly not apprised of information collection and its potential
detriments. Furthermore, a child or parent who has been victimized does not

benefit from a private right of action. Any regulation directed at protecting an
individual's privacy rights should provide for an avenue of relief on behalf of
the victim. 159 Most importantly, general adult websites do not have to comply
with the Act unless they have actual knowledge that the online user is a child
160
under the age of thirteen.

Moreover, website operators have discovered ways to circumvent the Act.
For instance, "[t]o verify that the parent is the one who has denied or given
consent, some Web sites may choose to require credit card numbers or

photocopies of driver's licenses."' 61 Thus, the process of giving consent
exposes the adult's personal information to gathering, which is currently not
prohibited by law. Lastly, enforcement and detection of web operators who are
in violation of COPPA is a mystery. A study examining the compliance of over
100 websites revealed that "a disturbingly large number of children's sites are

still collecting personal information from children without providing
162
notification of their privacy policies or obtaining parental permission."'
4.

Financialand credit information.

Congress has targeted other industries with respect to the dissemination of
158 Id. §

6501(9). Parental consent is not required when the website operator uses information
to "respond directly on a one-time basis to a specific request from the child and is not used to
re-contact the child" or when the request for information is needed "for the sole purpose of
obtaining parental consent." Id. § 6502(b)(2)(A).
159
See Nicholas W. Allard, Privacy On-Line: Washington Report, 20 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 511, 528 (1998) (highlighting recommendations of 1995 United States Information
and Infrastructure Task Force); Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace:
InformationalPrivacy in the Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1223 (1997)
(recommending elements of comprehensive privacy regulation system). For recent
commentary addressing privacy rights under COPPA, see generally, Seth Safier, Between
Big Brother and the Bottom Line: Privacy in Cyberspace, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6 (2000);
Melanie L. Hersh, Note, Is COPPA a Cop Out? The Child Online PrivacyProtection Act as
Proof that Parents, Not Government, Should be Protecting Children's Interests on the
Internet, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1831 (2001).
160See

16 C.F.R. § 312.3 (2004).

161Kalinda Basho, Comment, The Licensing of Our Personal Information:Is It a Solution to

Internet Privacy?, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1507, 1520 (2000) (examining COPPA enforcement
problems).
1(- See
Net
Family
News,
That
Sticky
Kids'
Privacy
Issue,
at
http://www.netfamilynews.org/sl990723.html (citing CENTER FOR MEDIA EDUCATION, CME
ASSESSMENT OF DATA COLLECTION PRACTICES OF CHILDREN'S WEB SITES (1999)).

STANFORD LA WAND POLICY REVIEW

[Vol. 15.2

personal information. The Fair Credit Reporting Act' 63 (FCRA), which targets
1 64
the financial services industry, is widely acknowledged as inadequate.
Despite Congress's efforts "credit reporting agenc[ies] ha[ve] substantial
latitude to disseminate regulated personal information without an individual's
consent."' 165 This bill was said to be "butchered" as a direct result of industry
1 66
lobbying pressures.'
The FCRA purports to regulate the disclosure and collection of consumer
credit information in personal transactions between consumers and credit
providers, particularly the use of such information by "consumer reporting
agencies."' 167 Consumer reporting agencies are obligated to provide consumers
with the opportunity to access and correct credit information, and FCRA
imposes limitations on the use of consumer credit information and significant
fines for noncompliance.' 68 The Act was later amended to provide, inter alia,
that a "consumer report" excludes the communication of consumer credit
information to "affiliated" persons, provided that the credit provider "clearly
and conspicuously" discloses to the consumer that such information will be
communicated among affiliates.' 69 Further, the consumer
is required to be
170
given the opportunity to opt-out of such disclosures.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 171 (GLBA) similarly regulates financial
information. The Act requires financial institutions to disclose their privacy
policies to their customers. The policies generally contain the practices
172
regarding the collection, use, and disclosure of customer information.
Further, the Act permits consumer information to be shared with third parties
provided that the consumer receives notice from the financial institution and
did not opt-out of such sharing.173 Perhaps GLBA's most notable shortcoming
is that it allows financial institutions to share nonpublic personal information
with their affiliates. 174 In essence, the Act allows banks, credit card companies,
163 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). The Act is limited to credit reporting organizations only, i.e.,

organizations that prepare and disseminate personal information in a consumer report
bearing on an individual's credit-worthiness, credit standing, capacity, character, general
reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living. Id.
164 See Reidenberg, supra note 36, at 210-14 (revealing the Act's shortcomings with respect
to dissemination of consumer information).
165 Id. at 212.
166 See Bibas, supra note 34, at 596 n.39 (quoting Professor Arthur Miller).
167 Under the FCRA a creditor that discloses "consumer report" information becomes a
consumer reporting agency and is therefore subject to FCRA requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 1681
(2000).
168
id.

169 Id. § 1681a(d)(2) (added by Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 308 (1996)).
7

'.Id. § 168 Is(a)(4) (1998) (containing provision that was later deleted from the act).

17115 U.S.C. §§ 6801-09, 6821-27 (2000). The Act is also known as the Financial Services

Modernization Act of 1999. The Act took effect in July of 2001.
172 See 15 U.S.C. § 6803 (2000).
113 See id. § 6802(b).
174 See id. § 6802(b)(2).
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brokerage firms, and insurance companies to share their respective databases
with one another. However, they cannot sell customer data to third parties
without providing an opt-out notice to consumers.
A parallel can be drawn between the regulation of financial and credit
information and the potential regulation of charitable donor lists. As mentioned
earlier, the profiling of donors consists of assessing the financial background of
a given charitable donor. Information gathered to form charitable donor lists is
financial in nature. Indeed, constructing a donor list containing "contributors,
175
of $15.00 & over to heart or cancer appeals"' would require knowledge of a
donor's financial capabilities and the amount of a donor's previous giving.
Nothing could be more private and sensitive to a charitable donor than such
information. The need for a federally mandated opt-out regulation in the
context of charitable donors is thus apparent and necessary to the maintenance
of the public's trust in charities and nonprofit entities.
5.

The USA PATRIOT.Act.

On October 26, 2001, in response to the September 11 attacks, President
Bush signed the USA Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act into law. 176 The thrust of the Act and the
controversy accompanying it centers on provisions that facilitate the
government's surveillance of citizens' everyday activities and the collection of
personal information. 177 There has been much recent scholarship on the Act
theoretical, and practical aspects of this
addressing the constitutional,
78
groundbreaking legislation.1
175 See W.S. Ponton, Inc., Philanthropic Donor Lists, at http://www.geocities.com/wsponton
/pages /Olphilan (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
176Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1, 115 Stat. 272, 272-75 (2001) (providing title and table of
contents).
177 See id. § 816, 115 Stat. at 385 (creating cyber-security training for law enforcement). On
the controversies surrounding the Act, see Mell, supra note 10, at 376 (comparing the effects
of the surveillance provisions to the Orwellian Big Brother state).
178
See, e.g., Jennifer C. Evans, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,
33 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 933 (2002) (arguing that the PATRIOT Act represents a threat to
citizens' constitutional rights); Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA
PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother that Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 607 (2003) (arguing that the
PATRIOT Act is not as invasive as is often portrayed); Lawrence M. Lebowitz & Ira L.
Podheiser, A Summary of The Changes in Immigration Policies and Practices After The
TerroristAttacks Of September 11, 2001: The USA PATRIOT Act and Other Measures, 63
U. PITT. L. REV. 873 (2002) (focusing on immigration-related provisions of the PATRIOT
Act and other pending legislation and administrative changes); Michael T. McCarthy, Recent
Development: USA PATRIOT Act, 39 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 435 (2002) (describing the
PATRIOT Act as a legislative proposal and the reactions of civil liberties groups).
For recent scholarship on the infringements of civil liberties resulting from the
PATRIOT Act and post-September 11th generally, see LOST LIBERTIES (Cynthia Browne,
ed., 2003); DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS (2003): NAT HENTOFF, THE WAR ON THE BILL OF
RIGHTS AND THE GOVERNMENT

RESISTANCE

(2003);

PHILIP B. HEYMANN,

TERRORISM,
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While the PATRIOT Act was geared towards combatting terrorism, several
other provisions in the Act relate to the privacy rights of charitable donors and
consumers alike. For instance, the Act's amendments to the Telemarketing
Act 179 affected the scope of the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR), particularly in
the context of the solicitation of charitable contributions and TSR's
applicability to nonprofits. 180 First, section 101 l(b)(2) of the Act adds a new
section to the Telemarketing Act requiring the FTC to include in the "abusive
telemarketing acts or practices" provisions of the TSR a requirement that
any person engaged in telemarketing for the solicitation of charitable
contributions, donations, or gifts of money or any other thing of value, shall
promptly and clearly disclose to the person receiving the call that the purpose
of the call is to solicit charitable contributions, donations, or gifts, and make
such other disclosures as the Commission considers appropriate, including the
name and mailing address
8 of the charitable organization on behalf of which
the solicitation is made. ' 1
This new requirement is significant in that it implicitly recognizes the time
costs and informational rights-if not the privacy rights-of charitable donors
as a separate and distinct class of individuals.
More importantly, and perhaps more relevant to the privacy rights of
charitable donors, section 1011(b)(1) of the PATRIOT Act amends the
"deceptive telemarketing acts or practices" provision of the Telemarketing
Act.' 82 This amendment states that the FTC shall include in such rules
respecting deceptive telemarketing acts and practices a definition of deceptive
telemarketing acts or practices "which shall include fraudulent charitable
'8 3
solicitations."'
The FTC has interpreted the amendments to the Telemarketing
Act effectuated by section 1011 of the PATRIOT Act together with the
unchanged sections of the Telemarketing Act and has concluded that for-profit
entities that solicit charitable donations must comply with the Telemarketing
Sales Rule (although the TSR does not apply to not-for-profit organizations

FREEDOM, AND SECURITY (2003); THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE AGE
OF TERRORISM (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003); JEFFEREY ROSEN, THE

NAKED CROWD (2003).
1' 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(2) (Supp. 2003) (including fraudulent charitable solicitations in
scope of regulation of deceptive telemarketing). The TSR gives the FTC and state attorneys
general law enforcement tools to combat fraudulent activities carried out by telephone.
Additionally, the TSR provides consumers with privacy protections and defenses against
unscrupulous telemarketers. The rule prohibits misrepresentations and requires telemarketers
to give consumers certain disclosures including but not limited to the seller's identity, the
purpose of the call, the nature of the goods or services offered, and that no payment or
purchase is necessary to win if a prize promotion is offered. Companies that violate the TSR
can be subject to FTC enforcement action and fines of $10,000 per violation.
180 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
'Sl Id. § 1011 (b)(2)(D), 115 Stat. at 396.
82 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(2) (Supp. 2003).
183 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1011(b)(l), 115 Stat. 272, 396 (2001)
(emphasis added).
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themselves). 184
The importance of these amendments with respect to the regulation and
potential enhancement of the rights of charitable donors cannot be understated.
The PATRIOT Act amendments bring the Telemarketing Act's jurisdiction
over charitable solicitations in line with the jurisdiction of the FTC under the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) by expanding the TSR's scope to
include not only the sale of goods or services, but also charitable solicitations
85
by for-profit entities on behalf of nonprofits.' This indirect expansion of the
FTC's jurisdiction under the FTC Act can potentially empower the agency to
further regulate and safeguard the privacy interests of donors notwithstanding
the fact that the FTC lacks a direct jurisdictional mandate over nonprofit
entities.
B.

ComprehensiveEfforts to Regulate the List Trade

As early as 1977, consumers, recognizing that their personal information
was being non-consensually gathered and sold, alerted Congress that the trade
in mailing lists required comprehensive regulation.1 86 The Privacy Protection
Study Commission ("Privacy Commission") was directed by Congress to
conduct a "study of the data banks, automatic data processing programs, and
information systems.., to determine the standards and procedures in force for
the protection of personal information."' 187 After conducting a comprehensive
study, the Privacy Commission essentially recommended that marketers remain
free to conduct their businesses with minimal interference. 188 The Privacy
Commission recommended that list gatherers should inform consumers about
the secondary uses they would make of information they gathered, and should
provide consumers with the ability to opt-out of inclusion on lists. 189 The
Privacy Commission credulously (and perhaps intentionally) believed that
businesses would voluntarily adopt privacy safeguards. "A person engaged in
interstate commerce who maintains a mailing list should not be required by law
to remove an individual's name and address from such a list upon request of
184 The

FTC noted that, despite its broad mandate to regulate charitable solicitations made

via telemarketing, the PATRIOT Act amendments did not expand the FTC's jurisdiction
under the TSR to make direct regulation of nonprofit organizations possible. FTC,
Telemarketing Sales Rule, Proposed Rulemaking, 67 Fed. Reg. 4492 (Jan 30, 2002).
185 Id. For a discussion of the FTC Act, see infra Part VI.A.
86 See generally U.S. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN

INFORMATION SOCIETY (1977) (recommending that those engaged in interstate commerce

who maintain a mailing list should not be required to remove an individual's name upon
request except as otherwise required).
187 David F. Linowes, Preface to U.S. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL
PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY (1977), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/

ppsc 1977report/preface.htm.
88 See id.
8
' 9 See id. at 1-51.
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that individual," the Privacy Commission urged. 190 The Privacy Commission
was swayed by the economic importance of direct mail, the reliance of
nonprofit organizations and political candidates, and the impracticability of
mandating a system of name removal. 191
The Privacy Commission further recommended that consumers and
charitabledonors alike be given the option to refuse dissemination of personal
information.192 The recommendation explicitly provided that "when a privatesector organization is informed by one of its consumers, members, or donors
that he does not want his address, or name and address, made available ... the
organization should promptly take whatever steps are necessary to assure that
Thus, the need to protect
the name and address is not so used . . . .
consumers and donors alike was quite apparent, as both groups have similar
privacy concerns. While the pioneer congressional committee on privacy was
completely inaccurate in its perception of organizations that disseminate
information, the Privacy Commission was foresighted about the fact that
donors should be included as a protected class in any legal scheme addressing
privacy concems.
There are few reports that, in retrospect, ring as hopelessly outdated as the
1977 Privacy Committee Report. The Privacy Commission's wishful model of
self-regulation has crumbled. Consumers are virtually defenseless against
businesses that disseminate194personal consumer information without seeking
consent and with impunity.
Recently, however, Congress has awakened from its decades-long neglect.
Many bills that mention privacy were pending at the end of the 2000
congressional session. One of these bills that failed and is now being
reintroduced, the Consumer Privacy Protection Act (Privacy Act), 195 calls for
general privacy legislation.' 96 The Privacy Act was introduced in the Senate on
May 23, 2000, and was referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
' 90 Id. at 147.
191 See id. at

147-48.

192 See id. at 151.

193 Id. (emphasis added).
194 See Reidenberg, supra note 36, at 197-98 (describing changing privacy landscape
following Privacy Commission Report). There are regulations that give consumers the option
to opt-out (for example, financial institutions under the GLBA are required to do so).
However, most of these institutions make it difficult to opt-out and raise transaction costs for
consumers who choose to opt-out. There is even a story of one consumer who mailed many
opt-out letters, yet he still receives one to seven junk mail letters each day. See G. Bruce
Knecht, Junk-Mail Hater Seeks Profitsfrom Sale of His Name, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 1995,
at B 1 (describing suit brought against magazine for releasing subscriber information).
195 Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2000, S. 2606, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter 2000
Privacy Act]; Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 1636, 108th Cong. (2003)
[hereinafter 2003 Privacy Act].
196 See Grant Gross, New Privacy Laws Less Likely: Congress is Focusing on Span,
Observers Say, PC WORLD, July 21, 2003 (describing lack of congressional citation to online
consumer privacy), availableat http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid, I 1659,00.asp.
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Science, and Transportation, where it ultimately failed. 197 A watered down
version of the 2000 bill recently has been reintroduced in the House by
Representative Cliff Steams and twenty-two co-sponsors. 198 While the scope of
the Privacy Act does not reach the desired level of regulation, it does have
many beneficial features.
The original Privacy Act of 2000 was to open with a startling declaration
of theoretical rights: "(1) The right to privacy is a personal fundamental right

worthy of protection through appropriate legislation; (2) Consumers engaging
in and interacting with companies engaged in interstate commerce have an
ownership interest in their personal information, as well as a right to control
how that information is collected, used or transferred."1' 99
The Act further would have required consumer opt-in consent (customer
required to choose affirmatively) to online collection of personally identifiable

information, and opt-out consent (customer permitted to decline) for nonpersonally identifiable information. Both the FTC and state attorneys general
would have standing to sue violators, and private individuals would have
standing to sue for misuse of personally identifiable information.' °° While the
Act was a respectable effort to combat the problems consumers are faced with,
it did not provide an avenue of recourse for charitable donors. The diluted 2003
manifestation of this Act also does not provide for privacy problems in the
nonprofit context.
VI. POTENTIAL MEANS OF REDRESS FOR CHARITABLE DONORS

Apart from the possibility of a private contract-based action, 20 or of
197See 2000 Privacy Act, S.2606, 106th Cong. § 2 (2000). The Committee and the FTC
cooperated in hearings on Internet privacy and online profiling. See Hearing on Online
Profiling and Privacy Before the Senate Comm. On Commerce, Sci. and Trans., 106th Cong.
(2000), available at http://www.commerce.Senate.gov/hearings/hearin00.html; see also
Hearing to Review the FTC's Survey of Privacy Policies Posted by Commercial Web Sites
Before the Senate Comm. On Commerce, Sci. and Trans., 106th Cong. (2000), available at
http://www.commerce.Senate.gov/hearings/hearin00.html.
198
2003 Privacy Act, H.R. 1636, 108 th Cong. (2003). The bill requires companies collecting
personal information to notify customers and tell them for what purpose the information is
being collected. The Steams bill also allows customers to refuse to let entities share their
data in an opt-out scheme, while the original 2000 Privacy Act followed an opt-in paradigm.
See Gross, supra note 196; see also, Press Release, Representative Cliff Steams, Steams
Introduces Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2003 (Apr. 4, 2003), availableat
http://www.house.gov/steams/PressReleases/PR203Releases/pr-030404-privacy.html.
199
2000 Privacy Act, S.2606, 106th Cong. § 2(1), (2) (2000).
200 See id.

201It is possible and perhaps desirable for donors who make gifts to nonprofits to enter into
contractual agreements by which they prohibit donees from making use of knowledge of
their gift in any way. For more on the ability of individuals to enter into private agreements
relating to their personal privacy, see generally Jeffrey M. Lacker, The Economics of
FinancialPrivacy: To Opt-Out or Opt-In?, 88/3 FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. Q. 1
(2002), available at http://www.rich.frb.org/pubs/eq/pdfs/summer2002/lacker.pdf, arguing
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incidental coverage under the provisions of the statutes discussed above,
charitable donors do not, currently, have any established claim for the
unauthorized sharing of personal information against the nonprofit
organizations to which they donate. The FTC and state attorneys general,20 2
however, are governing authorities that can potentially respond to donor
problems. The question that surfaces is whether these organizations have
jurisdiction over nonprofits. If they do have jurisdiction, do they have authority
to police this kind of activity? This Part will discuss several possible avenues
for redress that donors might pursue in connection with list-related privacy
rights.
A. The FTC, the IRS, and Donor Lists
Under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2), better known as Section Five of the FTC Act,
the FTC is empowered to "prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations" from
using "unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.' 20 3 Although this catch-all
does not grant the FTC specific authority to protect privacy, over the last few
years it has been construed to prohibit certain privacy invasions based on
deception. 20 4 For example, if a company makes a promise on its website or in
company literature to abide by certain practices and later breaches that promise,
it may be prosecuted for committing an unfair or deceptive practice contrary to
Section Five of the FTC Act. 20 5 Although this authority is useful, "the
that consumers and financial institutions are generally free to agree to alternative
arrangements with respect to the dissemination of personal information.
Additionally, many givers insist on anonymity, which arguably precludes the collection
of any personal information about the anonymous giver. Indeed, any such dissemination of
an anonymous charitable donor's personal information would arguably undermine the
donor's intent to donate anonymously.
202 This Article will discuss the New York State Attorney General's role, specifically.
203 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000). The FTC is also responsible for overseeing and enforcing the
privacy provisions of the following laws: (1) The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1681 (2000), which regulates the use and disclosure of "consumer reports" by consumer
reporting agencies; (2) The Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108 (2000), which protects consumers from invasive and fraudulent
telemarketing practices; (3) The Children's On-Line Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6501-6506 (2000), which restricts the online collection of personal information from
children under the age of thirteen; (4) The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C §§ 68016809 (2000), which provides limited "notice" and "opt-out" rights to consumers over their
financial records; and (5) The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1999, 18
U.S.C. § 1028 (Supp. 2003), which strengthens the criminal laws governing identity theft
and charges the FTC with establishing a centralized complaint and consumer education
service for victims of identity theft.
204 See FED. TRADE COMM'N,
ELECTRONIC

MARKETPLACE:

PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE
REPORT

TO

CONGRESS

(2000),

available

at

http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf.
205 See id. This however is certainly not a sufficient substitute for enforceable and
comprehensive privacy laws.
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Commission lacks authority to require firms to adopt information practice
.... "206
policies or to abide by the fair information practices principles
The statute, however, appears to exempt nonprofit and charitable
organizations from the FTC's jurisdiction. The statute only applies to "persons,
partnerships or corporations. 20 7 The FTC can assert jurisdiction over
nonprofits if the activities of the organization resemble the activities of a
business. 208 The test courts generally follow focuses attention on the effect on
209
the consumer.
In FTC v. Saja,210 a fundraising organization engaged in a fraudulent
fundraising practice that deliberately defrauded consumers. The FTC brought
FTC Act. 21 1
an action against the organization for violating Section Five of the
The organization defended on the grounds that the FTC has no jurisdiction over
nonprofit organizations, the FTC Act limits jurisdiction to actions that are "in
or affecting commerce. '2 12 The court was persuaded by the FTC's argument,
that because the organization "solicit[s] donations throughout the country over
interstate telephone lines and collect[s] the resulting pledges by mail or through
United Parcel Service . . . . some of Defendant's solicitations are for the
purchase of advertising in a publication
,,213 The court concluded that the
"[d]efendant's activities affect interstate commerce.' 214 The question of
whether the sale of donor lists constitutes a commercial activity within the
purview of Section Five has yet to be decided.
There are, however, cases that seek to determine the tax consequences of
selling donor lists. Nonprofit organizations are generally tax-exempt. 2 15 The
government supports this exemption to encourage public service by nonprofits.2 16 There is an exception to the tax-exempt status privilege: when
nonprofits engage in business activities that compete with for-profit entities,

206

See id. at 34.

207

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2000); see, e.g., Cmty. Blood Bank of Kansas City, Inc. v. FTC,

405 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1969) (barring the FTC from asserting jurisdiction over nonprofits).
208 See Tara Norgard, Note, How Charitableis the Sherman Act?, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1515,
1515-16 (explaining that when charities operate like businesses they are treated with the
same force of law that constrains businesses).
209 See FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994) (enunciating the test that
focuses on whether a material representation, omission, or practice is likely to mislead
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances).
2'0 No. CIV-97-0666-PHX-SMM, 1997 WL 703399, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 1997).
211 See id.

212 See id. at * 1, *2 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2000)).
213 Id. at *2.
24 Id. at *3.
215 Section 501(c)(3) of the Federal Income Tax Code exempts an organization's income
from taxation if the organization's purpose is religious, charitable, scientific, literary,
educational, or public safety testing.
216 See generally Committee on Exempt Organizations, Important Developments During the
Year: Exempt Organizations,43 TAX LAW. 1201 (1990).
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that activity may be taxed as unrelated business taxable income (UBTI). 217 The
purpose of UBTI is to maintain a level playing field between taxable and
2 18
nonprofit organizations. Specifically excluded from UBTI are "royalties.,
Courts have construed "royalties" to mean "a share of product or profit
219
reserved by owner of property for permitting another to use the property."
The question of whether the selling of donor lists is UBTI is important in
the context of whether the FTC has jurisdiction over such claims. If the practice
is considered income, the FTC arguably can exercise jurisdiction by asserting
that when charities operate like businesses they are treated with the same force
of law that constrains businesses. In Disabled American Veterans v. United
States,22 ° the question of whether the sale of donor lists constituted income was
at issue. The Disabled American Veterans (DAV), a nonprofit organization,
had an extensive mailing list of contributors that contained a wealth of
information. 221 The mailing list took "considerable time, effort and expense" to
maintain, and two paid employees were fully devoted to its maintenance and to
rental activities. 222 The group used the mailing list for two reasons. First, the
DAV solicited their own contributions. 223 Second, they allowed other nonprofit
organizations to use the DAV mailing list for a fee. 22 4 The reason the group
rented the list was to "gain additional revenue" especially "in the light of the
substantial costs [DAV] incurred in the regular maintenance of its donor
,225
list.,
The court in Disabled American Veterans held that the income derived
from the sale of mailing lists was taxable income-income that was subject to
the UBTI statute. 226 The judge relied on the facts that the mailing list income
was from a trade or a business, was regularly carried on, and was unrelated to
227
its exempt purpose..
After finding the donor list income to be UBTI, the court
held that the payments were not228royalty income due to all the work the DAV
invested in maintaining the lists.
While the DisabledAmerican Veterans case was a victory for the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), since then there have been only defeats. 229 No other
217

See 26 U.S.C. § 51 1(a) (2000).

See 26 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2) (2000).
See Sierra Club v. Comm'r., 86 F.3d 1526, 1531 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1330-31 (6th ed. 1979)).
220 650 F.2d 1178 (Ct. Cl. 1981), af'd, 104 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
22
1Seeid. at 1182.
222 Id.
223 See id.
224 Id. at 1184-85.
225 Id. at 1184.
226 Id. at 1185-88.
227 Id.
228 Id at 1189-90.
229 See, e.g., Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1535-36 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding
218
219

donor list income excluded as a royalty); Common Cause v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 332,
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case before the courts has applied the UBTI to donor list income. All such
income has been found to be excludable from the UBTI as a royalty payment.
The first case in which a United States Court of Appeals reviewed whether
mailing list income could be excluded as royalty payments was the Ninth
23
Circuit in Sierra Club v. Commissioner. 0 The Ninth Circuit held that while
royalties had to be payments for the right to use intangible property, such
23 1
After defining "royalty,"
payments could not be compensation for services.
the Ninth Circuit then applied it to the Sierra Club's donor list income. Since
the Sierra Club did not provide any services, the23court excluded the sums
2
received from the UBTI under the royalty exclusion.
Notwithstanding the formidable line of precedent against taxing income
derived from list selling, the practice of selling donor lists is inconsistent with
the policies of nonprofit exemption status. The policy behind granting
exemption status is to allow the income to flow more directly to the charity and
the public interest. The nonconsensual dissemination of donor information
undermines the public trust and is therefore inconsistent with the reason why
the federal government issues exempt status. How can offending the donating
public by selling their often very private information without their consent be
consistent with the policy of serving the public interest? The practice seems
irreconcilable with the policy.
As a consequence of the donor list tax cases, it is more difficult to argue
that the activity of selling mailing lists by nonprofits is commercial and
therefore subject to FTC jurisdiction. Interestingly, however, in a case
unrelated to donor lists, the Supreme Court may have inadvertently renewed the
potential for FTC regulatory activity in the nonprofit sector. In Camp
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,233 the Supreme Court reviewed
234
In doing
the legitimacy of a town tax assessment against a nonprofit camp.
so, the Court held that the status of the camps as nonprofit entities did not
preclude the application of the Commerce Clause. 235 Moreover, the Court
suggested that nonprofits can and do, in fact, engage in interstate commerce as
providers of goods and services. 236 This important finding that nonprofits
engage in commercial activity can potentially offer the FTC a way to become
more active in the nonprofit sector if it chooses to do so.
Unrelated to the taxation of lists as income, the IRS in a separate context,
347 (1999) (holding that mailer's list rental payment is a royalty, which is excused from
UBTI); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2227, 2235

(1999) (stating that petitioner's income from operating a list rental business through
consultants was royalty income that was excluded from taxation).
230 Sierra Club, 86 F.3d at 1526.
231 Id. at 1535-36.
232 Id.
233 520 U.S.

564 (1997).

234 id.
235 Id. at 572-73.
236

Id. at 573.
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has subtly stressed the importance of donor privacy. In 2001, the IRS reversed
its position regarding public disclosure of information on Form 990, Schedule
B, Schedules of Contributors to nonprofit entities. 237 IRS Schedule B requires
most nonprofit entities to disclose the names, addresses, amounts, and other
information relating to receipt of donations received by nonprofits. 238 Prior to
Schedule B's inception in 2000, the IRS required such disclosure to appear on
Line Id on Form 990. 239 While Line Id was not supposed to be subject to
public disclosure, several inadvertent releases of donor information occurred.24 °
The new Schedule B is a separate schedule that bears a prominent legend
indicating that the form "is generally not open to public inspection except for
24 1
section 527 organizations."
The new Schedule B was said to "provide a means for the IRS to capture
the non-public donor information, clearly separate it from the otherwise public
Form 990 data, and withhold it from public inspection. ''242 While commentators
have suggested that the IRS has not done enough to seal loopholes under
243
Schedule B,
the IRS's action nonetheless, is a major recognition of donor
privacy interests.
B. State Avenues of Redress
The possibilities that currently exist for consumers and donors to challenge
list trading by seeking state remedies are limited. Attorneys general have not
pursued the problem of unauthorized data mining, and state courts have not
permitted actions by individual donors to proceed in court.
1. Attorneys general.
Outside the context of the confidentiality of membership lists demanded by
government offices or organization members, few state courts have considered
matters of nonprofit informational privacy. 244 It might be expected, however,
See Gregory L. Colvin & Marcus S. Owens, Outline on Form 990 Donor Disclosure:
Current Posture, Background, Options, 35 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 408, 408 (2002).
238 See id.
239 See id.
240 See id.
237

241

Id.

242 Id.
241

See id.

The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, developed by a Committee of the
American Bar Association and promulgated in a small number of states including Alabama,
South Carolina, Idaho, and Wyoming, contains a provision that prohibits the commercial
sale of nonprofit membership lists. Section 16.05 of the Act provides:
244

Without consent of the board, a membership list or any part thereof may not be obtained or
used by any person for any purpose unrelated to a member's interest as a member. Without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, without the consent of the board a membership list or
any part thereof may not be: (1) used to solicit money or property unless such money or
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that in New York, where the State of New York's Attorney General Charities
Bureau (NYAG) has been highly visible and active in charitable supervision,
and where the Attorney General has subjected nonprofit organizations to
criticism for failing to share lists with one another, the problem of donor lists
would have been addressed. With New Yorkers donating $10 billion to various
arm of the state government has been very active in policing
charities, this
24 5
nonprofits.
The NYAG's supervisory authority over charities is derived from the
common law of charitable trusts, as well as the parens patriae power of the
state to protect the public interest in public assets donated for public
purposes. 246 While the NYAG is authorized to police issues involving the
of the NYAG addressing the issue
public interest, there have been no instances
2 47
of the nonconsensual sale of donor lists.
2.

Redress in state court.

Consumers and donors have not been effective in using state courts as an
avenue of relief in the informational privacy context. Recently in Smith v.
Chase Manhattan Bank,248 several bank consumers sued Chase, alleging a
violation of General Business Law Section 349, 249 New York's consumer
property will be used solely to solicit the votes of the members in an election to be held by

the corporation; (2) used for any commercial purpose; or (3) sold to or purchased by any
person.
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 16.05 (1987). The statute vests authority to divulge

names in the hands of the boards and not donors, without any requirement for the board to
provide for any sort of opt-out by donors. Nor does the provision provide protection against
the sale of non-membership information. See also Lodge 1380, Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S.
Clerks v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1980) (addressing the issue of whether union
members should have access to union's membership lists); Sheldon v. O'Callaghan, 497 F.2d
1276 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1090 (1974) (requiring an international union to
make a membership list available to a local union so that the local could mail its views to
union members); Wirtz v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 218 F. Supp. 885 (D. Conn. 1963)
(forbidding the use or disclosure of union membership lists); Local 191, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Goldberg, 303 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 938 (1962)
(reiterating the congressional policy to limit access to union membership lists). The court
discussed the limitations to accessing union membership lists:
Congress granted only bona fide candidates for office the right to inspect a membership list
of a labor organization, and such a candidate had that right only once prior to the election:
that his right was only to inspect the list and not to make copies; and that the members whose
names the candidate was entitled to see were only those who were subject to a collective
bargaining agreement.
Id. at 406; see generally NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM: THE
EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN NONPROFIT SECTOR (2001).

245 Telephone Interview with William Josephson, Assistant Attorney General, and Deputy
Chief of the Charities Bureau (Apr. 17, 2002).
246 See id.
247 See id.

2" 741 N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
24"N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 1988).
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protection statute that prohibits unfair and deceptive acts and practices in trade
or commerce. 25 For plaintiffs to recover under this statute, they are required to
prove that "the challenged act or practice was consumer oriented, that it was
misleading in a material way, and that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of
251
the deceptive act."
The complaint alleged that Chase engaged in a deceptive practice by
sharing customer information with unrelated third parties in violation of its
commitment to protect customer privacy and confidentiality. 252 Without
providing the plaintiffs an opportunity to opt-out and without plaintiffs'
consent, Chase "sold information to nonaffiliated third-party vendors, including
the plaintiffs' names, addresses, telephone numbers, account or loan numbers,
credit card usage, and other financial data. 253 The information provided by
Chase to third-party vendors was used to create lists of consumers who might
be interested in their products and services. 254 These lists were then proliferated
among direct marketing and telemarketing agencies to conduct solicitations. 255
If the consumers would purchase the product or services, the third-party
vendors would in turn compensate Chase with a commission of up to twentyfour percent of the sale.256
The appellate division affirmed the trial court's decision dismissing all
causes of action for failure to state a claim. 257 The court emphasized that a
"deceptive act" under Section 349, whether a representation or omission, "must
be likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the
circumstances. ' '258 Furthermore, the court noted that actual injury must be
proven by plaintiffs, "though not necessarily pecuniary harm." 259 The thrust of
the court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim was plaintiffs' failure to allege and/or
prove any "actual injury.'

260

Quoting from the complaint, the court explained

that "the products and services offered to class members as a result of [Chase's]
Almost every state has enacted similar legislation, most of which are modeled after the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000). See MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD,
CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 107 (2d ed. 1991). These state laws differ from the federal act in
that they provide for some form of private remedy. See id.
251 Smith, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
250

2 2
253

See id at 101.
Id.; see also, Sovern, supra note 29, at 1306-20. For a more elaborate discussion of

privacy as it relates to unfair trade practices and deception under state law, see generally
Lawrence Friedman, Establishing Information Privacy Violations: The New
Experience, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 651 (2003).
254 Smith, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
255

York

Id.

256

Id.

257
258

See id. at 102-03.
Id. at 102.

259

Id. (citing Stutman v. Chem. Bank, 95 N.Y.2d 24, 29 (N.Y. 2000); Small v. Lorillard

Tobacco Co., 94 N.Y.2d 43 (N.Y. 1999); Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v.
Marine Midland Bank, 85 N.Y.2d 20 (N.Y. 1995)).
260

Id.
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practices of selling class members' confidential financial information included
memberships in discount shoppers' clubs, emergency road service plans, dental
and legal service plans, travel clubs, home and garden supply clubs, and credit
card registration and magazine subscription services. 26 1 Noting that this was
the plaintiffs' foremost claim, the court summarily decided that the only harm
was that "members were merely offered products and services which they were
free to decline. 262
Instead of focusing on the fact that the plaintiffs' personal and sensitive
financial information was widely disseminated absent their consent and in
complete contravention to Chase's "Customer Information Principles," the
Smith court focused on the effect of the deceptive act. The court seems to be
erroneously attached to the notion of a clear and present tangible injury, a
notion that undermines the social utility of state deception and unfair practices
legislation. Indeed, the Smith court itself clearly explained that actual pecuniary
loss is not a requisite for recovery under Section 349. Furthermore, the court
makes no mention of the frustrated privacy expectations the consumers had
every reason to rely upon.
The Smith decision is a recent demonstration of state courts bending over
backwards to protect industry interests and disregard the privacy rights of
plaintiff litigants. The court's perception of the harm as plaintiffs being "merely
offered products" 263 is grossly ignorant of what the lawsuit was about in the
first place-the deceptive invasion of privacy by Chase Manhattan Bank. By
summarily dismissing the plaintiffs' claim, the court all but licensed Chase's
behavior, irrespective of the windfall gained by the entity at the expense of the
consumers' privacy. The Smith case represents a hurdle for both consumers and
donors alike, as the case generally undermines the ability of plaintiffs to
challenge such invasions of privacy in the judicial arena.
VII.

BUILDING LEGAL RESPECT FOR DONOR PRIVACY

The appropriate solution to the problem of protecting donor privacy
requires the adoption of three different legislative solutions. First, a federally
mandated opt-out scheme applicable to donors should be devised. Second, a
national "do-not-share" database applicable to nonprofit solicitation should be
created. Third, the Authors recommend the creation of a statutory cause of
action for damages upon a showing that a donor was defrauded as a result of a
shared list.

261 id.

262 Id.
263 Id.
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A. The MandatedFederalOpt-Out Scheme
This Article has argued that the federal and state responses to the problem
of informational privacy thus far have been inadequate. While Congress and the
states have recently made efforts to legislate in a manner that is favorable to
consumers, there is much to be done. The FTC and state attorneys general
remain essentially toothless and uninterested, respectively, with respect to the
informational privacy concerns of consumers and even more so of donors. The
problems consumers are faced with extend to charitable donors; however,
donors have not had the benefit of laws protecting them. A clear and
conspicuous opt-out standard should be employed to prevent charities from
obscuring donor information.
Under a mandated opt-out system, donors would have the option to opt-out
of any trading in any of their personal information. Donors who wish to
maintain a high privacy level will be empowered with a choice to do so.
Mandating such a system will not prove to be costly, as a simple telephone
hotline or list of people who have opted out can be produced just as easily as
donor-lists themselves. If the federal government will not cede to the desire of
consumers for broad based reform in the privacy context, another industryspecific law giving charitable donors the right to opt-out of donor lists must be
adopted.
The implementation of such a standard will not be onerous on charities, as
many large foundations have already implemented privacy policies. The current
privacy policy of the United Way, by way of illustration, contains the elements
of a federally mandated rule:
We obtain donor CONSENT. Our promise to our donors is that their
information will not be shared or sold to other businesses or charities. We
respect a donor's right to be removed from our mailing list. We never publish
donor information in recognition materials without prior consent. We ensure
donor information is RELEVANT. Our purpose for collection of donor data is
primarily to understand: 1) who our donors are (personal or professional
interests, demographics, business information, community involvement); 2)
how we may improve our services to meet donor preferences and
expectations, and in doing so, enhance existing relationships and improve the
services we offer. We commit to keeping donor information
CONFIDENTIAL and stored SAFELY. We continually review and improve
methods of how donor information is shared with staff and volunteers who
rely on the information to efficiently fulfill their roles. Hard copy files of
specific individual information are kept under lock and key. Our computer
systems and web site are both secure, ensuring donor information is protected
from public view. We are APPROACHABLE and ACCOUNTABLE. 2 4
Many organizations have similar privacy policies, including some that give
264 See United Way's website at http://www.securewebexchange.com/calgaryunitedway.
org/donation/Our%2OCommitment%20to%2ODonor%2OPrivacy%20_website%20version_.
pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2004).
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265
The need
donors the opportunity to opt-out from any sharing of information.
for these policies to be mandated with the force of law rather than be voluntary
is premised on the analysis above: neither the for-profit nor the nonprofit
marketplace can protect privacy adequately if some organizations offer
personal information protection but others do not.
Charitable giving, moreover, is based on public trust and confidence. Any
undermining of this trust will ultimately impair the nonprofit organizations and
the causes to which they provide much needed aid. The problem of donor
privacy is a genuine concern that most donors consider first and foremost.
When adults were asked if they feel it is "okay or NOT okay for a charity to
share personal information like your name or address with others in order to
raise additional money for programs?" a resounding eighty-five percent of
adults chose "not okay. ' 266 Even when donors were reminded that "selling
donor lists can be an important source of income for a charity, 82% of adults
say charities should always give donors the option of taking their name off of
any list that might be shared with an outside organization. '" 267 In the area of
online giving, there already has been a giving deterrent that is attributed to the
lack of privacy protection. The reasons for most donors' hesitancy in making
online donations are privacy concerns and the reluctance to make financial
transactions online. 268
These empirically based concerns about donor consensus would be
expressly addressed by giving charitable donors their privacy back via a
mandatory opt-out scheme. A clear, conspicuous, and frequently recurring
opportunity to opt-out should be the bare minimum for charitable
organizations. 269 An appropriate safe-harbor, easy to understand "uniform optout form," together with recommended procedures for offering an opt-out
alternative (or alternatives), could be implemented universally by all charitable
organizations. 27 Such an opt-out should also explain the consequences of

265See, e.g., American Heart Association, Policy on Collection and Use of Personal
Information, at http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier= 11404 (last visited,
Apr. 20, 2004).
266 PRINCETON
EXPECTATIONS

SURVEY

RESEARCH

SURVEY:

FINAL

Assocs.,

BBB

REPORT

WISE

GIVING

7

(2001),

ALLIANCE

DONOR

available

at

http://www.give.org/news/Donor /%20Expectations%20Survey.pdf. The national survey was
given to over 2000 survey respondents and was conducted in the spring of 2001.
267 Id at 7.
61 Id. Along the same lines, fewer than one in ten people report having ever made a
charitable contribution often dollars or more on the Internet. Id. at 6.
269 The effectiveness and application of alternative models (e.g., mandated opt-in, economic
disincentives-the Ayres/Funk Model and obtaining directorial consent) will be discussed
immediately infra text accompanying notes 285-307.
270 Indeed, a study conducted by Jeff Sovern revealed that most
consumers do opt in when
given the choice. This empirical study undermines the theory that if a mandated opt-out
initiative existed, no donors would allow their personal information to be disseminated. See
Sovern, supra note 35. This argument however, presupposes that the characteristics of
donors and consumers are comparable.
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declining to opt-out in reasonably comprehensible language.
The discussion above has not only mentioned concerns about the sharing of
personal information to third parties; it has also included information regarding
the sharing of personal information within organizations and the subsidiaries
and partners of organizations. To be effective, any comprehensive approach to
donor privacy protection should include opportunities for donors to take
themselves off or opt-out of intra-organizational list-shares as well as interorganizational ones.
B.

The "Do-Not-Share" Database

The popularity and success of the "do-not-call" database in limiting
commercial telemarketing solicitations 271 suggests that this experiment could
be broadened to protect personal information as well. A registry of persons who
do not want any information they provide to be sold, traded, or exchanged
would be a positive step in the direction of privacy protection. Just as the donot-call registry encountered fierce opposition in the form of court challenges
from affected marketers, it is likely that a do-not-share database would be
subjected to similar constitutional challenges involving the impairment of an
272
organization's right to free speech. In light of the Tenth Circuit's upholding
2 73
of the do-not-call scheme in Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc. v. FTC,
the creation and existence of such a database appears to survive constitutional
scrutiny because the purpose of the database facilitates the contractual
understandings between the parties and does not restrict free speech rights of
sellers or gift recipients.
In Mainstream, the Tenth Circuit held that the exclusion of nonprofits from
the do-not-call registry did not invalidate the entire scheme. In doing so, the
271 See,

e.g., Associated Press, Do-Not-CallList Continues to Expand, WALL ST. J., Aug., 7,
2003, at B6; Business: Don't Call Me, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2003, § 4, at 2. ("Americans
have submitted at least 23 million phone numbers for the federal do-not-call registry. This
far exceeds the government's initial expectations. It is as if one-fifth of all American
households suddenly put 'no soliciting' signs on their front doors."); Matt Richtel, Feelings
Mixed, Millions Enroll To Block Calls, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2003, at Al.

While the "do-not-call" registry applies to for-profit telemarketers who conduct
interstate solicitations of charitable contributions, the personal information of charitable
donors is in no way protected under this model. See FTC Release, FTC Announces Final
Amendments to Telemarketing Sales Rule, Including National "Do Not Call" Registry (Dec.
18, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/12/donotcall.htm.
272 The "do-not-call" scheme was challenged on First Amendment grounds. See
DoNotCall.com,

ATA

Launches Legal Challenge Against New Rules (2003),

at

http://www.donotcall.com/lawsuit.asp. As stated, no First Amendment message would be
suppressed by the creation of a "do-not share" database in the donor list context. See Matt
Richtel, Technology Briefing Telecommunications: 'Do Not Call' List Challenged, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 2003, at C4.
273 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004) (reversing a lower court ruling invalidating the do-not-

call scheme on First Amendment grounds).
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court overturned a federal court's decision that found the registry
unconstitutional because it barred solicitations from companies while allowing
calls from charities and politicians. The Tenth Circuit's decision does not imply
the inability of the FTC to establish a nonprofit database. The court's finding
that the registry was a valid restraint on commercial speech does not speak to
the constitutionality and validity of a similar nonprofit database. Indeed, in a
applicable to
footnote, the court noted that the constitutionality of a list
274
nonprofits and politicians is a separate constitutional question.
The purpose of a do-not-share database would be to place all those
organizations that agree to receive donations from those who have registered
with the database on notice that all gifts from the registered donors are
conditioned on an understanding of strict personal information privacy. As
such, a donor would be effectively placing a condition on his donation. As a
matter of contract law a donor has a right to make a gift based on a condition of
anonymity, a fortiori, it is contractually permissible to condition gift-giving on
withholding the personal information of the donor.
The "do-not-call" model can be easily applied to the nonprofit privacy
context. Just as consumers are able to make requests to stop unwanted
telemarketing calls via the Internet or on a toll-free hotline,27 5 charitable donors
using similar mediums can opt to withhold their consent from nonprofits that
trade in personal information. Under this model, much like the "do-not-call"
model, nonprofits would be required to download the registry database and
remove all registered donors from their lists (thereby precluding the selling,
renting, or bartering of the donor's personal information) at least once every
ninety days. 276 A nonprofit that fails to comply with a donor's request can be
277
subject to fines.
In essence, a "do-not-share" database would be a government sponsored
opt-out opportunity, as donors, to receive protection, would be required to
affirmatively sign onto the database to protect the nonconsensual dissemination
of their names, contact information, the amount and causes to which they
donate, and other information. The appeal of such a database as a solution to
the donor privacy problem lies in the relatively simple way of creating such a
database and the low transaction costs for donors, the government, and
nonprofits in maintaining the database. A do-not-share model of this type
See id. at 1233 n.2.
211 With respect to the "do-not-call" list currently in place, consumers can register online at
http://www.donotcall.gov or via a toll-free hotline by calling 1-888-382-1222.
274

276 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, CALLING ALL TELEMARKETERS:
AMENDMENT TO THE

FTC's

TELEMARKETING SALES RULE (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/

buspubs/calling.pdf.

277 Telemarketers who violate the amendments to the Telemarketing
Sales Rule or an
individual's do-not-call request could be subject to fines of up to $11,000. See Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Q&A for Telemarketers and Sellers About the Do Not Call Provisions of the
FTC's Telemarketing
Sales
Rule,
at
dncbizalrt.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).

http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alers
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278
would preserve the privacy expectations of charitable donors who subscribe.

C. The Creation of a Statutory Cause ofAction
Whether on a state-by-state basis or through a single federal statute, a right
of action against a person or entity who shares information notwithstanding an
opt-out should be specified legislatively. Just as Dean Prosser's common law
privacy tort paradigm protects against the invasion of privacy, 27 9 a similar
private right of action should be available to charitable donors whose personal
information has been nonconsensually misappropriated for a commercial
28
purpose. 0
The tort of misappropriation involves the use of an individual's name or
likeness for a commercial profit. 281 In essence, when a charity is disseminating
a donor's personal and confidential information for a profit, they are
misappropriating what the donor holds most private. The misappropriation
privacy tort, however, has traditionally applied to cases involving public figures
"who do not seek privacy but on the contrary seek out opportunities for public
,282
disclosure."
A claim based on informational privacy will not succeed on a
common law misappropriation tort theory. Therefore, it behooves state
legislatures and Congress to plug this widening gap in the law by enacting
provisions containing an283express private right of action-something they have
thus far neglected to do.
Given the scarce resources of state attomeys general to enforce, the
principal incentives to share information notwithstanding the express wishes of
donors, and the overarching risk that disregarding donor privacy rights could
undermine confidence in the nonprofit sector, a private right of action should
Facilitation by the government of contract terms designed to prevent one-sidedness in
consumer transactions has not been problematic in other contexts. For instance, the FTC's
Holder in Due Course Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433. 1(c), 443.1 (e) (2004), generally prohibits sellers
and creditors from using contractual language denying consumers protections provided
under state contract and other commercial laws.
279 See William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389-407 (1960).
278

280 The four torts deriving from the common law "right to be let alone" are "intrusion upon

seclusion," "public disclosure of private facts," "false light," and "misappropriation." This
Part will primarily focus on misappropriation. Id. at 389. These torts have been largely
codified by several jurisdictions. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 540.08 (West 2002); IND. CODE §§ 4-1-6-1 to -9 (2002); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 214,
§ 3A (Law. Co-op. 1999); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-52 (Consol. 1992 & Supp. 2004);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-1-28 to -28.1 (1997); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A app.
reporter's note (1989 & Supp. 1990) (noting the states that have adopted privacy torts in one
form or another).
281 See Prosser, supra note 279, at 402-07.
282 DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1198 (2000) (noting that misappropriation tort generally

safeguards celebrity status).

283 All the government responses to the privacy problem discussed in Part V fail to provide

constituents with a private right of action. Rather, Congress has relegated the enforcement of
these privacy rights to the FTC.
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be available for charitable donors. 284 A distinct parallel can certainly be drawn
between information containing the amount and to what causes an individual
donates and the "sensitive" classification in the Online Privacy Protection Act.
Charitable donors are no less deserving of a forum in which they can exercise
their rights to keep their confidential information private. A legislatively
specified statutory cause of action would accommodate these important
concerns.
D. The Application ofAlternative Models

There have been several other models attempting to remedy the problem of
privacy in the consumer context. First, Ian Ayres and Matthew Funk have
recently proposed that a "market for personal information" be created that will
produce economic disincentives in the form of direct compensation to
consumers from the entities that trade in the personal data.285 Second, the
notion that individuals be given the opportunity to opt in before their
information is sold or traded will be assessed in the nonprofit context. An optin like regime is currently in place in Canada under the Canadian Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). This Part
will attempt to apply these alternative models to the nonprofit context and
reveal their shortcomings and deficiencies regarding the distinct nonprofit
privacy arena.
1. The Ayres-Funk market approach model.
Ian Ayres and Matthew Funk have recently attempted to formulate a
market solution to the negative externalities stemming from telemarketing
solicitation, junk mail, and spam email. 286 The Ayres-Funk model proposes to
allow individual consumers to choose the price per minute they would like to
receive as compensation for listening to telemarketing calls. 287 Such a "name
your own price" mechanism would be implemented by crediting consumers'
phone bills for any commercial solicitations they agree to hear. 288 This model
284 Contra Ronald L. Plesser & Stuart P. Ingis, Limiting Private Rights of Action in Privacy

Legislation, at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/ccp/privaterightofactionl.shtml (last visited Apr.
20, 2004) (arguing that "[pirivate causes of action in privacy statutes offer incentives for
class action lawyers, and result in the spending of significant amounts of money to defend
lawsuits raising technical claims.").
215 Ayres & Funk, supra note 105 and accompanying text.
286 See id.
287

Id. at 101.

288 Id. at 101-08. Interestingly, Ayres and Funk also posit that such a scheme would be

beneficial to the telemarketers as well. Once consumers are voluntarily opting to receive
telemarketing calls (in return for tailored compensation), it becomes possible to deregulate
the telemarketers-lifting current restrictions on the time (no night time calls) and manner
(no recorded calls). For example, if the prohibition against tape-recorded messages were
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imposes economic disincentives on telemarketers and direct marketers, and
further encourages telemarketers to screen contacts more effectively to locate
consumers who are more likely to be interested in their solicitation.
The market approach model effectuates consumer compensation for the
calls they agree to receive and those calls would presumably be more narrowly
tailored to the consumer's personal interests. 289 The consumer generally
establishes the price to be paid by the telemarketers, though the approach does
contemplate a possibility of the telemarketers setting the price.290 Each
individual household establishes its compensation price and the telemarketers
29
discretionarily call the households they wish to solicit. 1
Applying such an economic incentive-based model to the nonprofit context
presents difficulty for Ayres and Funk. Conceptually, they find it to be
counterintuitive and inconsistent with the purpose of soliciting for charitable
contributions to impose a compensatory cost on telemarketers for doing so.292
Charitable solicitations are to some degree positive externalities-there may be
positive third-party externalities to the solicitations that trump the donor's
interest in being left alone. Because charitable solicitation produces a sufficient
third-party benefit-namely to those in need of the charities services or
funds-and after dabbling with a theory of govermment subsidized
compensation to donors, Ayres and Funk ultimately
suggest that charitable
293
solicitation be exempt from the duty to compensate.
Although the proposal is new and the case unproven, there is a stronger
argument than Ayres and Funk acknowledge for extending their proposal to
nonprofits as well as for-profits. First, it is much more than the donor's wish to
be left alone that is at stake on the detrimental side of the equation. Second,
there are distinctions to be drawn in the types of nonprofit solicitations that
potential donors receive which might warrant extending their proposal to some
nonprofits, if not all of them. Third, there is little evidence to indicate that the
net effect of the proposal would be to diminish the general level of charitable
giving. Finally, there are precedents for applying the Ayres-Funk proposal to
nonprofits as well as for-profits.
The extent to which the externalities are positive in the aggregate depends
upon the parties to whom lists are sold for the purpose of solicitations. Surely
repealed, we could imagine local grocery stores or movie theaters using the telephone to
provide consumers with useful information about specials. And faced with increasing caller
resistance, we imagine that survey groups, such as the Gallup Poll, might welcome the
opportunity to compensate survey respondents so that they might be able to produce more
representative samples. See id. at 78..
289 See id. The telemarketer is likely to set up an automated program refusing to call
consumers who have posted prices that exceed some maximum amount.
290
See id. at 113.
291 See id.
292
See id. at 118.
293 See id. at 119 ("[C]haritable contributions further more general public interests or that
political communications help secure better government for all.").

2004]

A DONOR'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY

there is no positive externality in deterring telemarketing fraud and identity
theft, pervasive problems that are as significant in nonprofit as for-profit
solicitations.294 Recent indications are that there is a direct relationship between
295
the sharing of donor lists and the likelihood of both fraud and theft. The costs
associated with identity theft and fraud resulting from nonprofit charitable
solicitations are great 96 and should be added to any calculus attached to the
donor's need to be left alone.
Even if the positive benefit to third-party charities (considering only those
the potential donor did not know about) is larger than the harm done to donors
in the aggregate, furthermore, there are distributional effects on particular
classes of potential donors to be taken into account, particularly among the
elderly, the very young, and the poor. Just as many consumer protection
statutes are directed at discrete classes of especially vulnerable consumers, so
294On the frequency of identity theft due to tenuous personal information standards, see
generally, Nicole M. Buba, Note, Waging War Against Identity Theft: Should the United
States Borrowfrom the European Union's Battalion?, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 633
(2000); Brandon McKelvey, Comment, Financial Institutions Duty of Confidentiality To
Keep Customers' Personal Information Secure from the Threat of Identity Theft, 34 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1077 (2001). Fraudulent charitable solicitation has always been a concern.
See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Charitable Donations: Give or Take?, at http://www.ftc.gov/
bcp/conline/pubs/tmarkg/charity.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
295Indeed the FTC has cited to several reasons as to how the crime of identity theft is
perpetrated, one being the "use [of] personal information you share on the Internet" and
another involving the purchasing and selling of personal information. Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Id Theft: When Bad Things Happen To Your Good Name, at www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/
pubs/credit/idtheft.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004). Additionally, the FTC has launched a
campaign, advising people to manage to the best of their ability the availability of their
personal information. "By managing your personal information wisely, cautiously and with
an awareness of the issue, you can help guard against identity theft." Id.
296The following facts signify the prevalence and costs of identity theft:
" In 1992 TransUnion received only about 35,000 calls about identity theft, from victims
and those concerned about potential crime. In 2001 they received more than a million
calls.
" It is estimated that 700,000 to 1.1 million people became victims of this crime in 2001.
That number is based on various reports including those from members of law
enforcement.
" The Secret Service estimates that in 1997 consumers lost more than $745 million due to
identity theft.
" A Florida Grand Jury estimated that the average identity theft crime costs the business
community about $17,000 per victim. (report found under Speeches). If we use the
number 700,000 victims, that means a loss of $11.9 billion in 2001.
" This number does not include victim costs including legal assistance, judicial and law
enforcement time in investigating and trying cases.
" A GAO study on identity theft (GAO-02-363, issued March 2002) discussed costs to
federal agencies-The executive office for U.S. Attorneys estimated cost of
prosecuting a white-collar crime case was $11,443. The Secret Service estimates the
average cost per financial crime investigation is $15,000. The FBI estimates the
average cost per financial crime investigation is $20,000.
" On average, victims spend 175+ hours and $1,000 in out-of-pocket expenses to clear
their names. (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse and FTC).
Identity Theft Resource Center, Facts and Statistics, at http://www.idtheftcenter.org/html/
facts-and-statistics.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
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the metering proposal could in principle be applied to some or all of these
groups.
There is also a possibility, concededly speculative, that any decrease in
nonprofit revenues resulting from the Ayres-Funk proposal would not occur in
proportion to increased costs resulting from metering nonprofit solicitations.
The present-day permissibility of intercompetitive solicitation by charities may
well impose a high "intra-brand" fundraising expense effect. Much of the
tobacco industry claims that the high advertising budgets of the various brands
shift consumption patterns from one brand of cigarette to another but do not
have an impact on overall consumption levels, 297 so it may be true that
solicitations by charities affect the particular choice, but not the general level,
of charitable spending. Viewed in this light, any diminished revenue to
nonprofits could be offset by the possibility of a shift in the general proportion
of nonprofit resources that are devoted from marketing and solicitation to
activities more directly related to charitable missions.
Finally, there are precedents for imposing metered costs on the nonprofit
list trade. Expensive postage costs are currently attached to charitable
solicitations that surely fall into the category of fundraising disincentives. The
Ayres-Funk proposal essentially provides donors with an option to have
"Postage Paid By Addressee," applicable not just to postage, but to telephonic,
email and other forms of solicitation. In the case of postage, however, the costs
being defrayed are directly related to the labor involved in conveying the
solicitation; and in the proposal the costs defrayed are the estimated costs to
donors of processing the messages they receive. To the extent that donors could
choose to impose no cost whatsoever upon the sender, it is not likely that the
proposal, if applied equally to for-profits and nonprofits alike, would face an
insurmountable constitutional impediment.
Compensating a donor for consent to trade in the donor's personal
information would not necessarily be counterintuitive. And yet such a proposal
may be more extreme and administratively difficult than would be necessary to
achieve a substantially optimal level of donor privacy. One possibility would be
to amend the Ayres-Funk suggestion by imposing monetary disincentives on
nonprofits that trade in donor lists by way of taxing the list trade rather than
imposing bureaucratic and other costs on individual donors.
2.

The mandatory opt-in model.

A mandatory opt-in model would require affirmative steps by charitable
donors to allow the collection and/or use of information. If the charitable donor
does not affirmatively act to allow the nonprofit to use his or her personal
information, the entity is forbidden from doing so. Professor Jeffrey Sovern,
297

See ASH.org, Factsheet no.19: Tobacco Advertising and Promotion (2004), at

http://www.ash.org.tuk/html/factsheets/htm/fact19.html.
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along with others, has proposed such a solution in the for-profit context as the
298
A recent Federal Communications
best way to honor the consumer interest.
Commission (FCC) ruling illustrates how an opt-in would function in practice.
After interpreting the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the FCC issued a
ruling that phone companies seeking to utilize calling patterns for marketing
consent. 299
and other similar purposes must first obtain the consumer's express
and
The telephone companies were required to seek the consent of consumers
300
in many cases attempted to do so by sending mailings to subscribers.
Similarly, under Canadian law, effective January 1, 2001, if a Canadian
charity seeks to use the personal information of charitable donors for a purpose
that deviates from the one for which it was originally collected, the charity
would be required to obtain consent from the donors beforehand. 30 1 The
30 2
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)
establishes rules for how private sector organizations-including nonprofitsmay collect, use or disclose personal information in the course of commercial
activities. 30 3 The Act defines "commercial activity" as "any particular
transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that is of
commercial character, including the selling,
bartering or leasing of donor,
30 4
lists."
fundraising
other
or
membership
These express provisions of the PIPEDA effectively function as an opt-in
protection for charitable donors. This protection raises the question of whether
a mandatory opt-in model is desirable and/or economically feasible given the
delicate competing interests inherent in the nonprofit arena.
298

See Sovem, supra note 35, at 1034; Jeff Sovem, Helping Consumers Protect Their

PersonalInformation, 12 ADVANCING THE CONSUMER INTEREST 23 (2000).

299 See Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer Propriety Network Information and
Other Customer Information, 63 Fed. Reg. 20,326 (Apr. 24, 1998) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. pt 22, 64); see also U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
300 For a discussion on the effectiveness of opt-in privacy measures in the consumer privacy
context, see generally Sovern, supra note 35.
301See Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), S.C. 2000
ch. 5 (Can.). Part 1 of the Act (Personal Information Protection) establishes rules governing
the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information and Part 2 (Electronic Documents)
addresses the use of electronic alternatives to paper. This Act took effect on January 1, 2001.
The Act applies to the disclosure of personal information across provincial and territorial
boundaries.
302 The Act is available in its entirety on the Canadian Privacy Commissioner's website,
available at http://www.privcom.gc.ca/legislation/02_06 01_e.asp (last visited Apr. 20,
2004).
3" For a comprehensive discussion of PIPEDA's personal information
provisions, see
generally Erika King & John H. Fuson, An Overview of Canadian Privacy Law for
Pharmaceuticaland Device Manufacturers Operating in Canada, 57 FOOD DRUG L.J. 205
(2002).

114See PIPEDA, S.C. 2000 ch. 5, § 2(1) (emphasis added). For a
discussion of the scope of
PIPEDA's coverage, see Juliana M. Spaeth, et al., Privacy, Eh!: The Impact of Canada's
PersonalInformation Protection and Electronic Documents Act on TransnationalBusiness,
4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 28, 33 (2002).
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While protecting donor privacy is of vital importance, nonprofits have a
significant competing public interest in effectively fundraising for their
underlying charitable causes-an interest not present in the consumer privacy
context. Fundraisers generally spend between twenty and forty cents for each
dollar of donations they raise. 30 5 These costs result from transaction and
origination costs, namely the labor, printing, postage, solicitation,
administration, and other miscellaneous expenses associated with fundraising
campaigns. A recent study suggested that an opt-in data restriction in the
nonprofit arena would increase administrative costs for charities by thirty
percent, thereby causing the charities to expend approximately fifty-three cents
to raise each dollar of donations. 30 6 The study estimates that should an opt-in
model become law, "approximately $16.5 billion currently30 7allocated to
charitable programs will be spent on additional marketing costs."
As discussed earlier, nonprofit fundraising is dependant on hundreds of
millions of dollars generated by the selling, renting, and bartering of donor
lists. 30 8 Donor lists are arguably the best source of data for marketing and
fundraising purposes. An opt-in model is certainly a more aggressive (and
possibly more effective) way of addressing the consumer privacy problem,
however, in the consumer realm the public's interest in the funds of nonprofit
charities is not present. The unintended cost consequences of an opt-in model
could potentially undermine nonprofit fundraising, which in effect, could prove
to be harmful to those dependent on charitable funds. There are also
constitutional impediments to be considered in proposing a legislated
mandatory opt-in approach. Since this additional delicate dynamic is present in
the nonprofit context, the Authors believe mandatory opt-in data restriction
would be inconsistent with the public's interest in maximizing funds for
charitable purposes. The mandatory opt-out proposed by the Authors would
afford donors with the privacy protection they deserve and appropriately
balance the fundraising goals of charitable organizations for the public interest.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Recent surveys suggest that public confidence in nonprofits has declined
considerably. 30 9 The public's confidence "affects almost everything that
305 See MICHAEL
FUNDRAISING

A.

TURNER & LAWRENCE

FOR CHARITABLE

&

G. Buc,

NONPROFIT

THE IMPACT OF DATA RESTRICTIONS ON
INSTITUTIONS

4 (2002), available at

http://www.infopolicy.org/documents/charity.doc.

306 See id. at 3-4. The study was based on interviews with nonprofit fundraising experts from

diverse sectors, fundraising data, and publicly available nonprofit data.
307 Id. at 5.
308 See Meeks, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
309 See The Brookings Institution, As End of Year Giving Season Kicks Off, Public

Confidence in Charitable OrganizationsRemains Shaken (2002), at http://www.brookings.

edu/comm/news/200 2 1210nonprofits.htm. Indeed more than half of people surveyed had
"fair" or "not too much" confidence in charitable organizations. A little over ten percent of
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matters to the future of the nonprofit sector, especially the public's willingness
to contribute money and volunteer time. Even a small decline in confidence
should raise alarms across the sector." 3 10 A survey conducted in 2003 by the
Federation of Nonprofits revealed that nine out of ten donors want the chance
to take their names off donor lists before they are exchanged. Moreover, a
donor bill of rights drafted and approved by several large nonprofit
organizations in recent years 311 unequivocally recommends that donors should
have "the opportunity for their names to be deleted from mailing lists that an
organization may intend to share." 312 In the words of Charles Fried, "[privacy]
is necessarily related to ends and relations of the most fundamental sort:
respect, love, friendship and trust," because these relations necessitate "a
context of privacy for their existence." 313 The time has come to empower
charitable donors with a choice: a choice that is responsible and considerate to
their personal privacy, and a choice that enhances and protects the trust in the
nonprofit sector. Adopting the solutions recommended in this Article would
move the law toward accomplishing these essential objectives.

survey participants had "no confidence at all" in charities.
310
/d. (quoting Paul C. Light, Director of The Brookings Center for Public Service).
311 Some of these foundations include: The American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel,
Association for Healthcare Philanthropy, Council for Advancement
Education, and the Association of Fundraising Professionals.

and Support

of

3" Council for Advancement and Support of Education, Donor Bill of Rights, at
http://www.case.org/Content/AboutCASE/Display.cftnCONTENTITEMID=2569
(last
visited Apr. 20, 2004).
313 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1968); see also Ruth Gavison, Privacy
and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 451 (1980) (stating that privacy promotes
individual liberty, autonomy, and personal enrichment).
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